So Is There Anything We Can't Abolish?

I don't know what it is about James Carroll's writing that make me just shake my head. Perhaps it's his advocacy of utopian fantasies backed up by a poor grasp of facts. (See my earlier post on his piece in favor of outlawing space weapons.) In his latest op-ed ("If Poison Gas Can Go, Why Not Nukes?" Boston Globe, 23 June 2008), Carroll advocates nuclear abolition--certainly a worthy goal and one that plenty of very reasonable thinkers have advocated. However, Carroll supports his argument with a rambling, incorrect, and largely irrelevant account of efforts to outlaw chemical weapons.

Trying to provide some historical background, Carroll claims that "in 1925, gas was indeed outlawed by the Geneva Convention." This is actually not accurate; the Geneva Convention outlawed "the use in war" of chemical weapons (and even the meaning of that was long debated) but not the development, acquisition, or stockpiling of CW. Therefore, Carroll is wrong when he claims that "assumptions about the inevitability of weaponized gas prompted Britain, in 1939, both to stockpile the banned substance and to distribute gas masks to its citizens." Neither the "substance" nor its stockpiling was banned until the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.

Carroll claims that after World War Two, chemical weapons had "been made morally acceptable by the relatively even more heinous nukes." I agree that the development of nuclear weapons may have made CW somewhat less repugnant to some observers, but I think that there were also several other factors that reduced revulsion to CW in the middle of the 20th century. These included the long time that had elapsed since the widespread use of CW in World War One, recognition of the increased military requirements of the Cold War, and the development of "non-lethal" CW (such as riot-control agents and herbicides, which, while still objectionable to some, did not seem quite as heinous as agents like Lewisite and sarin). OK, this is a relatively minor point and not so much an objection to Carroll's argument as a comment.

However, Carroll is on pretty shaky ground when trying to apply the lessons of outlawing CW to nuclear abolition efforts. First, he claims that the legitimacy of chemical weapons "has been entirely removed, their permanence rejected. The poison gas realists of 1919 have been proven wrong." Unfortunately, the "poison gas realists of 1919" (who believed that "history shows that in no case has a weapon which has proved successful in war been abandoned") have not been proven entirely wrong. In fact, although many countries have abandoned (or are currently eliminating) their CW stockpiles in accordance with the CWC, several others continue to maintain clandestine programs, including Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Syria. Terrorists continue not only to acquire but even to use CW. (Aum Shinrikyo did so in the Tokyo subway system in 1995, and al Qaeda has laced bombs with chlorine in Iraq in recent years, although with relatively little effect.)

It is easy to dismiss such counterexamples as minor exceptions of little consequence. However, the consequences become much more significant when one tries to apply the example of the CWC to nuclear abolition. If one state squirreled away a few nuclear weapons while others complied with a nuclear abolition agreement, the cheater could greatly jeopardize the security of other states and even the stability of the international system.

For this reason, the example of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention might provide a better lesson for nuclear abolitionists than that of the CWC. As with the CWC, although just about every country has joined the BWC, clandestine biological weapons programs continue, and terrorists have conducted several bioattacks since the treaty went into effect, including the 2001 anthrax attacks, in which five Americans died. Fortunately, the United States has decided that it does not need to retain its own offensive biological weapons stockpile, since it can retaliate effectively against any BW attack with conventional weaponry. However, it is not clear that the threat of conventional retaliation would deter a state (or, perhaps, even a terrorist) that held the world's only few nuclear weapons. That is why verification is such a critical component of any nuclear abolition effort.

Although many people have considered this problem, no one has yet proposed a satisfactory verification mechanism. If Carroll demonstrated how states could give up their nuclear weapons and while ensuring that all other states (and non-state actors, as well) remained non-nuclear, too, then I would be the first person to endorse the abolition of nuclear weapons as a practical near-term goal. It is a great idea, but at least for the foreseeable future, Carroll is simply dreaming.

Deterrence vs. Denial

Have you ever heard the phrase, "deterrence by denial"? Of course you have! I hate this expression. In my opinion, deterrence and denial are distinct, and this phrase is gibberish.

Now, I understand that many definitions of the "d" terms (deterrence, denial, defense, dissuasion, defeat) exist within the international relations community. However, "deterrence" and "denial" are distinct. The former is a kind of dissuasion; specifically, it is dissuasion of another actor by threatening something that he values. For example, I declare that if he attacks me, then I will retaliate against his population centers. By making such a declaration (or even conveying the idea to him privately or by non-verbal means), I hope to dissuade him from attacking me in the first place. The latter term refers to denying another actor the ability to undertake some action. For example, I convince a supplier not to provide him with modern tanks, which denies him the ability to attack me with those tanks.

I know that many people like to use the phrase "deterrence by denial," but I find that in general what they really mean is simply "denial."

Preventing an Outer Space Arms Race?

James Carroll addressed an important topic recently in his op-ed piece, "Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space" (Boston Globe, 12 May 2008). Unfortunately, he presents a skewed picture of the current situation and gets the argument wrong in two key ways.

First, Carroll paints the United States as the space warfare bogeyman. He suggests that China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in January 2007 was merely a response to U.S. provocation while decrying the United States' more recent shootdown of a wayward satellite. Carroll, however, fails to mention that United States provided advance public notice of the shootdown, conducted it in low-earth orbit to prevent debris from interfering with other satellites, and, whether people choose to believe it or not, at least put forth a plausible justification for its action based on safety considerations, while China did none of these things.

Furthermore, Carroll fails to distinguish between the roles that countries like the United States and China would play in any "space war." China, as the weaker power, would likely try to prevent the military use of space in any future conflict, disabling U.S. satellite capability in any way possible. The United States, as the stronger power, would try to preserve the use of space for communication, navigation, and surveillance. Therefore, it is very likely that China would be the one to initiate "space war" during any hypothetical conflict between the two.

The second key weakness of Carroll's piece is that he depicts the United States as the primary obstacle blocking a treaty that could prevent a space arms race. He notes that the United States is "refusing to discuss a treaty aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space" yet fails to mention that such a treaty would be virtually unverifiable. While treaties such as those prohibiting chemical and biological weapons are certainly useful, few believe that they have succeeded in eliminating the development of these kinds of weapons; in fact the Soviet Union began a major expansion of its biological weapons program in the early 1970s, soon after it signed the Biological Weapons Convention.

Carroll claims that "humans who did not think to ban weapons from the air a century ago know better when it comes to outer space." Here, too, Carroll is wrong. Humans did think to ban weapons from the air a century ago; not only that, but at various times they also thought to ban weapons under the sea, weapons that poison, and weapons that fire bullets. Let's not be naive; every kind of technology adaptable to the conduct of warfare has been used by man for that purpose despite sometimes Herculean efforts to the contrary.

Don't get me wrong; it would be great to eliminate the possibility of conflict in space. Furthermore, even imperfect treaties have value. However, the strength of Carroll's advocacy of a space warfare treaty should be tempered by the fact that no treaty will eliminate such competition entirely.

This is an important topic and deserves a comprehensive consideration of the issues involved rather than simply bashing the current U.S. position.

Is the Long War Necessary?

In a recent opinion piece, Iraq War skeptic Andrew J. Bacevich criticizes the "long war" against terrorism ("The 'Long War' Fallacy," Los Angeles Times, 13 May 2008). However, the Boston University professor's arguments go a bit too far.

First, Bacevich quotes former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as saying in September 2001 that "we have a choice—either to change the way we live, which is unacceptable, or to change the way that they live; and we chose the latter." Bacevich claims that "in this context, 'they' represent the billion or so Muslims inhabiting the greater Middle East." Yet I fail to see the basis for that claim; I interpret "they" to refer only to those who support terrorism against the United States, and reading that sentence in the full context of Rumsfeld's remarks supports that interpretation. In fact, on 23 October 2001 Rumsfeld clarified his position, stating that "the choice we have either is we change the way we live or we change the way the terrorists are living."

Furthermore, Bacevich argues that the long war has been ineffective and claims that "efforts to spread democracy have either stalled or succeeded only in enhancing the standing of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah." Now, Iraq and Afghanistan may not be model states, but they are certainly more democratic than they were under Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. Perhaps progress in those countries has "stalled," but they have clearly made quite a bit of progress.

Worse, Bacevich fails to offer a real alternative to the "long war." He merely suggests "curbing our appetites, paying our bills and ending our self-destructive dependency on foreign oil and foreign credit." Perhaps the last of those options would help to reduce terrorism against the United States, but it certainly can not solve the problem alone.

Like it or not, the United States simply must combat terrorism abroad. We have no other choice.

So, How Much Does This War Cost?

Chris Duquette recently panned the arguments that Joseph Stiglitz put forth in The Three-Trillion Dollar War claiming that the Iraq War has cost, well, three trillion dollars. ("The Price Of War? Obscuring the Debate with Fuzzy Math," Washington Times, 9 May 2008.) However, Duquette's criticism does not stand up to scrutiny. First off, let me point out that although I have heard of Stiglitz's book, I have not actually read any of it, and I have not made up my mind about Stiglitz's arguments. OK, now let's get to Duquette's criticism.

First, Duquette denies "the charge that the Iraq war has boosted the price of oil on world markets." To support his argument, Duquette merely points out that "Iraq's oil production has returned to pre-war levels." Yet the price of oil depends on many other factors, as well. For example, although Iraq is producing roughly as much oil as it produced before the war, it is doing so under much worse security conditions. Shippers must take greater risks to transport crude from Iraq's southern fields to the Persian Gulf and pay greater rates for insurance. Pipelines face the threat of sabotage and must be secured. Oil infrastructure damaged by wear, sabotage, or fighting needs to be repaired. To be honest, I don't know by how much all of this increases the price of Iraqi oil (or the price of oil on international markets), but Duquette apparently simply ignores these factors. He claims that oil prices have risen "because of a one-two punch of rising global demand and the weakening dollar." I don't deny that these factors have affected prices (and I might also add the lack of sufficient refining capacity), but I imagine that the poor security conditions under which Iraqi oil is produced and transported have contributed to the rise, as well.

Next, Duquette criticizes Stiglitz's argument that "the Iraq war has turned the U.S. economy toward recession." Duquette correctly notes that "economists define a recession as two straight quarters of negative economic growth." Duquette then cites Department of Commerce statistics that real GDP growth for the last three quarters was 4.9 percent, then .6 percent, then .6 percent again. Duquette claims that "that's below trend, but it's not recessionary." True, but according to Duquette, Stiglitz never claimed that the U.S. economy was in a recession, only that it was "turned . . . toward recession." So to me, DOC's statistics appear to support Stiglitz or at least not to strongly contradict him. Furthermore, although Stiglitz and Duquette are both economists, not everyone sticks to the formal definition of "recession." For example, according to a survey conducted by Research Pros Inc. in late February 2008, "a majority of top US executives believe the American economy is already in a recession or will slide into one within six months." ("US Executives Braced for Recession: Poll," Agence France Presse, 6 March 2008.) According to a March 2008 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll, "about three-quarters of all Americans think the economy is now in a recession and the number who feel that way continues to grow." ("CNN Survey: Three out of Four Say U.S. Economy in Recession," Xinhua General News Service, 17 March 2008.) And Berkshire Hathaway chairman and CEO Warren Buffett said in early March "that the U.S. economy is essentially in a recession even if it hasn't met the technical definition of one yet." (Josh Funk, "Buffett Says US Economy Essentially in a Recession, Expects Tough Ride for Insurers," The Associated Press, 3 March 2008.) Whether you want to stick with the formal definition or not, Stiglitz appears to be on solid ground here.

Next, Duquette notes that "the Iraq war's cost . . . equates to 1.0 percent of GDP," implying that the war costs relatively little. Yet one percent is a huge fraction of the national economy. True, other wars have cost more, but that doesn't mean that they were cheap or even a bargain. (Of course, economic costs pale in comparison to human costs, but Stiglitz and Duquette are focusing only on economic costs.) Duquette also points out that "even with the Iraq war, today's defense share of GDP [which he cites as 4.0 percent] is lower than at any point during the Cold War." That hardly reassures me, since I would be appalled if we were spending a greater fraction of GDP on defense now than when we were facing off against a global superpower.

Finally, Duquette complains that "Mr. Stiglitz links the Iraq war to President Bush's tax cuts and faults the two for the increase in the federal budget deficit." Duquette's only criticism of this claim, however, appears to be that "the Iraq war costs $150 billion per year" while "the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts together cost close to twice that." OK, so Duquette is saying that the tax cuts had roughly twice as much of an impact on the budget deficit as the war. I fail to see how that rebuts Stiglitz's claim that both contributed to the increase in the budget deficit.

Let me reiterate that I have not read Stiglitz's book and have no opinion about his arguments. I simply do not know enough about them to judge whether I think that they hold water or not. However, I have read Duquette's rebuttal, and his arguments seem to leak like a sieve.

The Caucasian Conundrum

One of the things that occurred during my little hiatus (the recent few weeks during which I failed to update this blog...) was that the tension between Georgia and Russia increased greatly. First, Russia announced an expansion of ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two separatist regions within Georgia. Then Georgia claimed that Russia had shot down a couple of its drones. (Another Georgian drone had been shot down weeks earlier; video appeared to indicate that a Russian aircraft was responsible for that incident.) Most recently, Russia increased the number of its "peacekeepers" in Abkhazia. (It is unclear whether such an increase was permissible. A NATO spokesman said that an increase in Russian forces without Georgia's permission would violate a 1994 agreement, but European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana said that the increase might be within permitted limits. See Stephen Castle, "NATO Accuses Russia of Stirring Tensions in Rebel Georgia Areas," New York Times, 1 May 2008.)

All of this poses a quandary for the United States, since there seem to be few good options. On the one hand, it would like to support Georgia, a struggling post-Soviet democracy strategically located in the Caucasus along the potential route of an important oil pipeline and threatened by its much larger northern neighbor. On the other hand, the United States does not want to antagonize that neighbor and risk war with it. What's a superpower to do?

The answer is that we need to arm Georgia. It is true that I am not a big fan of getting mixed up in disputes in Russia's back yard; for example, I have always opposed the enlargement of NATO into the former Soviet Union. However, there are several reasons for which we should consider selling weapons to Georgia, perhaps at a steep discount.

First, arms sales would signal a U.S. commitment to Georgia after the MAP fiasco. (The United States strongly supported the extension of NATO "membership action plans" to Georgia and Ukraine, but NATO rejected the proposal at its summit in Bucharest, agreeing merely to reconsider the issue at the end of the year.) Although I was glad that the MAP proposal failed, the United States appeared weak, and the result at Bucharest certainly emboldened Russia to act more freely in Georgia.

Second, arms sales would signal displeasure with Russia's recent troop increase. Even if that increase were within permitted limits, it certainly was not helpful.

Third, arms sales would not upset Russia nearly as much as a deployment of NATO forces or the extension of a MAP, since arms transfers do not necessarily imply any permanent involvement or creep into Russia's sphere of influence. (Although arms sales can be a means of exerting influence with another country, a limited sale to Georgia would be unlikely to alarm Russia about any major U.S. presence in the country.)

Fourth, by reminding all parties involved that military action would be counterproductive, an arms transfer might encourage them to find a peaceful solution, such as the reintegration of the breakaway regions into Georgia in exchange for Georgia's agreement not to seek NATO membership. (This solution would probably be the best outcome, in any case. Although Abkhazia and South Ossetia would certainly object, Russia is the actor that really matters. If it agreed to such a solution, then Abkhaza and South Ossetia would have to accept reintegration into Georgia.)

There is one potential problem, however. Russia justified its recent increase of "peacekeepers" by claiming that Georgia was acquiring offensive arms in preparation for an attack on Abkhazia. (Georgia denied the claim.) How could the United States provide weapons to Georgia without giving Russia clear justification for its moves? The answer is that the United States must provide only defensive materiel, such as fixed air defense items. The sale of only defensive arms would limit Georgia's ability to use the items in any offensive against its breakaway regions (which could easily lead to war with Russia). Because such a sale would not significantly increase Georgia's ability to attack these regions, Russia would have a hard time using it to justify any provocative behavior supposedly in defense of the Abkhazians. Furthermore, providing Georgia with defensive arms might dissuade its enemies from mounting any attack upon it. We have already seen the use of Russian air power in Georgia (when a Russian aircraft shot down the first Georgian drone), so an air defense upgrade could greatly improve Georgia's ability to repel any attack.

In a situation in which the United States has few good options, providing a limited amount of defensive arms to Georgia might be the prudent way to support Tbilisi while avoiding any significant escalation in the region and might encourage all parties to work toward a comprehensive solution to Georgia's difficulties.

DOD Tries to Provide the News Abroad ... Again ...

So it's been a little while since I updated this thing... but hey, it's not like anything's been happening in the world, right? Well, I actually got really busy and am still catching up with the news, so today's entry responds to events from a couple of weeks ago.

On 1 May, USA Today carried a story describing the Department of Defense's creation of new news websites for foreign audiences (Peter Eisler, "Pentagon Starts Foreign News Sites; Journalism Groups Call Sites Deceptive Effort to Control Message Abroad," 1 May 2008). The title basically gets right to the controversy: is the Pentagon deceiving people who visit these sites?

First, let me point out that no-one appears to be claiming that the sites contain disinformation. DOD does appear to be trying to present facts, or at least information that it considers to be truthful.

How, then, might the department be deceiving readers? First, the fact that DOD supports the sites is not obvious. For example, on www.mawtani.com (the DOD news website for Iraqis), visitors have to click on an "about" link to discover DOD's sponsorship. Critics claim that few visitors are likely to click on such a link; many more will likely assume the site's content to have been provided by an independent news organization.

Second, while DOD does not appear to be planting false information on the sites, there is simply no such thing as completely objective news. Editors always skew how information is presented, even if only by deciding which stories to include and which to omit. A few years ago, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggested that only journalists who "will not reflect discredit on the U.S. government" should be hired for the websites (see Barbara Starr and Larry Shaughnessy, "Pentagon Sites: Journalism or Propaganda?," cnn.com, 5 February 2005). One has to wonder, then, what kind of example the United States is setting for other countries and whether the information on these websites is truly objective or is merely propaganda.

Yet there are still more reasons to object to these websites. First, we have to wonder, what is the Pentagon providing that other websites aren't? Is there really such a dearth of websites providing news to Iraqis? A similar website is being built for Latin America. Are Latin Americans really unable to get news on the internet currently?

Second, even if such an effort were necessary, why would DOD be in charge of it? These websites will cover general news, not just defense or security issues. Developing news websites appears to be well outside of DOD's mandate, especially since the United States already has a very capable organization (the Broadcasting Board of Governors) with extensive experience providing news to foreign audiences.

Finally, DOD can only get bad PR from this effort. No-one will be writing letters to Secretary Gates thanking him for finally bringing the news to information-starved Iraqis. On the other hand, this program can easily remind critics of DOD's previous public diplomacy missteps, such as its payment to Iraqi journalists for favorable news stories (the Lincoln Group scandal) and the short-lived Office of Strategic Influence. Notwithstanding the actual merits of those earlier efforts, many people will certainly associate the current websites with those projects and once again accuse DOD of spreading disinformation and propaganda.

DOD ought to get out of the news business and stick to its core competency. If there really is a need for websites to provide news to foreign audiences, then let the BBG handle it.