The Caucasian Conundrum

One of the things that occurred during my little hiatus (the recent few weeks during which I failed to update this blog...) was that the tension between Georgia and Russia increased greatly. First, Russia announced an expansion of ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two separatist regions within Georgia. Then Georgia claimed that Russia had shot down a couple of its drones. (Another Georgian drone had been shot down weeks earlier; video appeared to indicate that a Russian aircraft was responsible for that incident.) Most recently, Russia increased the number of its "peacekeepers" in Abkhazia. (It is unclear whether such an increase was permissible. A NATO spokesman said that an increase in Russian forces without Georgia's permission would violate a 1994 agreement, but European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana said that the increase might be within permitted limits. See Stephen Castle, "NATO Accuses Russia of Stirring Tensions in Rebel Georgia Areas," New York Times, 1 May 2008.)

All of this poses a quandary for the United States, since there seem to be few good options. On the one hand, it would like to support Georgia, a struggling post-Soviet democracy strategically located in the Caucasus along the potential route of an important oil pipeline and threatened by its much larger northern neighbor. On the other hand, the United States does not want to antagonize that neighbor and risk war with it. What's a superpower to do?

The answer is that we need to arm Georgia. It is true that I am not a big fan of getting mixed up in disputes in Russia's back yard; for example, I have always opposed the enlargement of NATO into the former Soviet Union. However, there are several reasons for which we should consider selling weapons to Georgia, perhaps at a steep discount.

First, arms sales would signal a U.S. commitment to Georgia after the MAP fiasco. (The United States strongly supported the extension of NATO "membership action plans" to Georgia and Ukraine, but NATO rejected the proposal at its summit in Bucharest, agreeing merely to reconsider the issue at the end of the year.) Although I was glad that the MAP proposal failed, the United States appeared weak, and the result at Bucharest certainly emboldened Russia to act more freely in Georgia.

Second, arms sales would signal displeasure with Russia's recent troop increase. Even if that increase were within permitted limits, it certainly was not helpful.

Third, arms sales would not upset Russia nearly as much as a deployment of NATO forces or the extension of a MAP, since arms transfers do not necessarily imply any permanent involvement or creep into Russia's sphere of influence. (Although arms sales can be a means of exerting influence with another country, a limited sale to Georgia would be unlikely to alarm Russia about any major U.S. presence in the country.)

Fourth, by reminding all parties involved that military action would be counterproductive, an arms transfer might encourage them to find a peaceful solution, such as the reintegration of the breakaway regions into Georgia in exchange for Georgia's agreement not to seek NATO membership. (This solution would probably be the best outcome, in any case. Although Abkhazia and South Ossetia would certainly object, Russia is the actor that really matters. If it agreed to such a solution, then Abkhaza and South Ossetia would have to accept reintegration into Georgia.)

There is one potential problem, however. Russia justified its recent increase of "peacekeepers" by claiming that Georgia was acquiring offensive arms in preparation for an attack on Abkhazia. (Georgia denied the claim.) How could the United States provide weapons to Georgia without giving Russia clear justification for its moves? The answer is that the United States must provide only defensive materiel, such as fixed air defense items. The sale of only defensive arms would limit Georgia's ability to use the items in any offensive against its breakaway regions (which could easily lead to war with Russia). Because such a sale would not significantly increase Georgia's ability to attack these regions, Russia would have a hard time using it to justify any provocative behavior supposedly in defense of the Abkhazians. Furthermore, providing Georgia with defensive arms might dissuade its enemies from mounting any attack upon it. We have already seen the use of Russian air power in Georgia (when a Russian aircraft shot down the first Georgian drone), so an air defense upgrade could greatly improve Georgia's ability to repel any attack.

In a situation in which the United States has few good options, providing a limited amount of defensive arms to Georgia might be the prudent way to support Tbilisi while avoiding any significant escalation in the region and might encourage all parties to work toward a comprehensive solution to Georgia's difficulties.

How Far Does NATO Need to Go?

As the NATO summit in Bucharest approaches, the United States would like to include Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia in the alliance and extend "membership action plans" (MAPs) to Georgia and Ukraine. Why? Sure, the United States would like to consolidate gains in territory previously considered to be within Russia's sphere of influence, and expanding further east gets NATO closer to various trouble spots, such as the Middle East. However, the consequences of expansion simply outweigh the benefits.

First, expanding eastward (especially into the former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine) would spur the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West. Western assertiveness (including U.S. insistence on expanding strategic ballistic missile defense into Eastern Europe) has already caused Russia to suspend participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, nix START II, restart provocative military actions (such as bomber flights over allied airspace and naval vessels), and threaten to pull out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty. Sure, Russia is relatively weak now and has only limited means of striking back at the West, but this situation will not last forever. As oil prices buoy the Russian economy and military and the government consolidates control within the country, Russian strength will only grow. The United States needs to take a long-term view of its relationship with Russia and plant the seeds of a cooperative, not confrontational, relationship now. This is not to say that we should let Russia hold our foreign policy hostage, but we need to understand Russia's interests and attitude and be able to anticipate its likely responses to our actions.

Second, adding these states as NATO members would debase the alliance's membership criteria. While all of these countries have made some military improvements, their defense capabilities are still nowhere near NATO standards. Furthermore, while they have implemented some democratic reforms, their fledgling democracies are still not out of the woods yet. (Ukraine's Orange Revolution occurred only a few years ago, and just this past winter Georgia's president imposed a state of emergency amid widespread popular protests against his rule.)

Third, we gain little, if anything, from adding these states to the alliance. We might gain basing rights, but there is little reason to put forces into Ukraine (unless we are already planning for a soured relationship with Russia), and while Georgia might serve as a jumping-off point for military action against Iran, there is little need for that as long as we maintain our other bases in the region (in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain, etc.), which seems likely for the foreseeable future. We might consider NATO's previous expansion: in 2004, NATO added seven Eastern European states (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania) to the alliance; has the addition of those states contributed any significant improvement to our security?

Fourth, adding new states brings new obligations for alliance members. Do we really want to be involved in planning for the defense of Ukraine against Russian aggression? What if the secessionist conflicts in Georgia (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) flare up? Or if Russia recognizes those regions as independent states (as it has threatened to do) and then increases its force levels there, on what the United States considers the sovereign territory of a NATO ally? Although Estonia did not invoke Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty when Russia launched a cyberattack against it last year, the feeble response called the alliance's ability to defend even its current members into question.

Fifth, how far does NATO really need to go? The alliance began as an organization of North Atlantic states; does it really need to extend its reach so far afield? If you believe that its primary mission ought to remain collective self-defense, then the answer is clearly no. If you support the alliance's push to take on new missions in the post-Cold War world, then perhaps. However, its record is, at best, spotty so far, as its operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have demonstrated.

For these reasons, NATO should not extend membership invitations to Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia. It is true that NATO only wants to extend MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine and that it might be able to resolve some of these issues before considering membership for those states. However, even extending MAPs has consequences, especially for the West's relationship with Russia. Therefore, the best course of action is for NATO to forego any moves toward expansion and instead deal with its existing issues, such as Afghanistan and Eastern European missile defenses. Doing otherwise would only worsen the alliance's security situation.