I don't know what it is about James Carroll's writing that make me just shake my head. Perhaps it's his advocacy of utopian fantasies backed up by a poor grasp of facts. (See my earlier post on his piece in favor of outlawing space weapons.) In his latest op-ed ("If Poison Gas Can Go, Why Not Nukes?" Boston Globe, 23 June 2008), Carroll advocates nuclear abolition--certainly a worthy goal and one that plenty of very reasonable thinkers have advocated. However, Carroll supports his argument with a rambling, incorrect, and largely irrelevant account of efforts to outlaw chemical weapons.
Trying to provide some historical background, Carroll claims that "in 1925, gas was indeed outlawed by the Geneva Convention." This is actually not accurate; the Geneva Convention outlawed "the use in war" of chemical weapons (and even the meaning of that was long debated) but not the development, acquisition, or stockpiling of CW. Therefore, Carroll is wrong when he claims that "assumptions about the inevitability of weaponized gas prompted Britain, in 1939, both to stockpile the banned substance and to distribute gas masks to its citizens." Neither the "substance" nor its stockpiling was banned until the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.
Carroll claims that after World War Two, chemical weapons had "been made morally acceptable by the relatively even more heinous nukes." I agree that the development of nuclear weapons may have made CW somewhat less repugnant to some observers, but I think that there were also several other factors that reduced revulsion to CW in the middle of the 20th century. These included the long time that had elapsed since the widespread use of CW in World War One, recognition of the increased military requirements of the Cold War, and the development of "non-lethal" CW (such as riot-control agents and herbicides, which, while still objectionable to some, did not seem quite as heinous as agents like Lewisite and sarin). OK, this is a relatively minor point and not so much an objection to Carroll's argument as a comment.
However, Carroll is on pretty shaky ground when trying to apply the lessons of outlawing CW to nuclear abolition efforts. First, he claims that the legitimacy of chemical weapons "has been entirely removed, their permanence rejected. The poison gas realists of 1919 have been proven wrong." Unfortunately, the "poison gas realists of 1919" (who believed that "history shows that in no case has a weapon which has proved successful in war been abandoned") have not been proven entirely wrong. In fact, although many countries have abandoned (or are currently eliminating) their CW stockpiles in accordance with the CWC, several others continue to maintain clandestine programs, including Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Syria. Terrorists continue not only to acquire but even to use CW. (Aum Shinrikyo did so in the Tokyo subway system in 1995, and al Qaeda has laced bombs with chlorine in Iraq in recent years, although with relatively little effect.)
It is easy to dismiss such counterexamples as minor exceptions of little consequence. However, the consequences become much more significant when one tries to apply the example of the CWC to nuclear abolition. If one state squirreled away a few nuclear weapons while others complied with a nuclear abolition agreement, the cheater could greatly jeopardize the security of other states and even the stability of the international system.
For this reason, the example of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention might provide a better lesson for nuclear abolitionists than that of the CWC. As with the CWC, although just about every country has joined the BWC, clandestine biological weapons programs continue, and terrorists have conducted several bioattacks since the treaty went into effect, including the 2001 anthrax attacks, in which five Americans died. Fortunately, the United States has decided that it does not need to retain its own offensive biological weapons stockpile, since it can retaliate effectively against any BW attack with conventional weaponry. However, it is not clear that the threat of conventional retaliation would deter a state (or, perhaps, even a terrorist) that held the world's only few nuclear weapons. That is why verification is such a critical component of any nuclear abolition effort.
Although many people have considered this problem, no one has yet proposed a satisfactory verification mechanism. If Carroll demonstrated how states could give up their nuclear weapons and while ensuring that all other states (and non-state actors, as well) remained non-nuclear, too, then I would be the first person to endorse the abolition of nuclear weapons as a practical near-term goal. It is a great idea, but at least for the foreseeable future, Carroll is simply dreaming.
Friday, June 27, 2008
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
Deterrence vs. Denial
Have you ever heard the phrase, "deterrence by denial"? Of course you have! I hate this expression. In my opinion, deterrence and denial are distinct, and this phrase is gibberish.
Now, I understand that many definitions of the "d" terms (deterrence, denial, defense, dissuasion, defeat) exist within the international relations community. However, "deterrence" and "denial" are distinct. The former is a kind of dissuasion; specifically, it is dissuasion of another actor by threatening something that he values. For example, I declare that if he attacks me, then I will retaliate against his population centers. By making such a declaration (or even conveying the idea to him privately or by non-verbal means), I hope to dissuade him from attacking me in the first place. The latter term refers to denying another actor the ability to undertake some action. For example, I convince a supplier not to provide him with modern tanks, which denies him the ability to attack me with those tanks.
I know that many people like to use the phrase "deterrence by denial," but I find that in general what they really mean is simply "denial."
Now, I understand that many definitions of the "d" terms (deterrence, denial, defense, dissuasion, defeat) exist within the international relations community. However, "deterrence" and "denial" are distinct. The former is a kind of dissuasion; specifically, it is dissuasion of another actor by threatening something that he values. For example, I declare that if he attacks me, then I will retaliate against his population centers. By making such a declaration (or even conveying the idea to him privately or by non-verbal means), I hope to dissuade him from attacking me in the first place. The latter term refers to denying another actor the ability to undertake some action. For example, I convince a supplier not to provide him with modern tanks, which denies him the ability to attack me with those tanks.
I know that many people like to use the phrase "deterrence by denial," but I find that in general what they really mean is simply "denial."
Saturday, May 31, 2008
Preventing an Outer Space Arms Race?
James Carroll addressed an important topic recently in his op-ed piece, "Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space" (Boston Globe, 12 May 2008). Unfortunately, he presents a skewed picture of the current situation and gets the argument wrong in two key ways.
First, Carroll paints the United States as the space warfare bogeyman. He suggests that China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in January 2007 was merely a response to U.S. provocation while decrying the United States' more recent shootdown of a wayward satellite. Carroll, however, fails to mention that United States provided advance public notice of the shootdown, conducted it in low-earth orbit to prevent debris from interfering with other satellites, and, whether people choose to believe it or not, at least put forth a plausible justification for its action based on safety considerations, while China did none of these things.
Furthermore, Carroll fails to distinguish between the roles that countries like the United States and China would play in any "space war." China, as the weaker power, would likely try to prevent the military use of space in any future conflict, disabling U.S. satellite capability in any way possible. The United States, as the stronger power, would try to preserve the use of space for communication, navigation, and surveillance. Therefore, it is very likely that China would be the one to initiate "space war" during any hypothetical conflict between the two.
The second key weakness of Carroll's piece is that he depicts the United States as the primary obstacle blocking a treaty that could prevent a space arms race. He notes that the United States is "refusing to discuss a treaty aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space" yet fails to mention that such a treaty would be virtually unverifiable. While treaties such as those prohibiting chemical and biological weapons are certainly useful, few believe that they have succeeded in eliminating the development of these kinds of weapons; in fact the Soviet Union began a major expansion of its biological weapons program in the early 1970s, soon after it signed the Biological Weapons Convention.
Carroll claims that "humans who did not think to ban weapons from the air a century ago know better when it comes to outer space." Here, too, Carroll is wrong. Humans did think to ban weapons from the air a century ago; not only that, but at various times they also thought to ban weapons under the sea, weapons that poison, and weapons that fire bullets. Let's not be naive; every kind of technology adaptable to the conduct of warfare has been used by man for that purpose despite sometimes Herculean efforts to the contrary.
Don't get me wrong; it would be great to eliminate the possibility of conflict in space. Furthermore, even imperfect treaties have value. However, the strength of Carroll's advocacy of a space warfare treaty should be tempered by the fact that no treaty will eliminate such competition entirely.
This is an important topic and deserves a comprehensive consideration of the issues involved rather than simply bashing the current U.S. position.
First, Carroll paints the United States as the space warfare bogeyman. He suggests that China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in January 2007 was merely a response to U.S. provocation while decrying the United States' more recent shootdown of a wayward satellite. Carroll, however, fails to mention that United States provided advance public notice of the shootdown, conducted it in low-earth orbit to prevent debris from interfering with other satellites, and, whether people choose to believe it or not, at least put forth a plausible justification for its action based on safety considerations, while China did none of these things.Furthermore, Carroll fails to distinguish between the roles that countries like the United States and China would play in any "space war." China, as the weaker power, would likely try to prevent the military use of space in any future conflict, disabling U.S. satellite capability in any way possible. The United States, as the stronger power, would try to preserve the use of space for communication, navigation, and surveillance. Therefore, it is very likely that China would be the one to initiate "space war" during any hypothetical conflict between the two.
The second key weakness of Carroll's piece is that he depicts the United States as the primary obstacle blocking a treaty that could prevent a space arms race. He notes that the United States is "refusing to discuss a treaty aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space" yet fails to mention that such a treaty would be virtually unverifiable. While treaties such as those prohibiting chemical and biological weapons are certainly useful, few believe that they have succeeded in eliminating the development of these kinds of weapons; in fact the Soviet Union began a major expansion of its biological weapons program in the early 1970s, soon after it signed the Biological Weapons Convention.
Carroll claims that "humans who did not think to ban weapons from the air a century ago know better when it comes to outer space." Here, too, Carroll is wrong. Humans did think to ban weapons from the air a century ago; not only that, but at various times they also thought to ban weapons under the sea, weapons that poison, and weapons that fire bullets. Let's not be naive; every kind of technology adaptable to the conduct of warfare has been used by man for that purpose despite sometimes Herculean efforts to the contrary.
Don't get me wrong; it would be great to eliminate the possibility of conflict in space. Furthermore, even imperfect treaties have value. However, the strength of Carroll's advocacy of a space warfare treaty should be tempered by the fact that no treaty will eliminate such competition entirely.
This is an important topic and deserves a comprehensive consideration of the issues involved rather than simply bashing the current U.S. position.
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
Is the Long War Necessary?
In a recent opinion piece, Iraq War skeptic Andrew J. Bacevich criticizes the "long war" against terrorism ("The 'Long War' Fallacy," Los Angeles Times, 13 May 2008). However, the Boston University professor's arguments go a bit too far.
First, Bacevich quotes former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as saying in September 2001 that "we have a choice—either to change the way we live, which is unacceptable, or to change the way that they live; and we chose the latter." Bacevich claims that "in this context, 'they' represent the billion or so Muslims inhabiting the greater Middle East." Yet I fail to see the basis for that claim; I interpret "they" to refer only to those who support terrorism against the United States, and reading that sentence in the full context of Rumsfeld's remarks supports that interpretation. In fact, on 23 October 2001 Rumsfeld clarified his position, stating that "the choice we have either is we change the way we live or we change the way the terrorists are living."
Furthermore, Bacevich argues that the long war has been ineffective and claims that "efforts to spread democracy have either stalled or succeeded only in enhancing the standing of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah." Now, Iraq and Afghanistan may not be model states, but they are certainly more democratic than they were under Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. Perhaps progress in those countries has "stalled," but they have clearly made quite a bit of progress.
Worse, Bacevich fails to offer a real alternative to the "long war." He merely suggests "curbing our appetites, paying our bills and ending our self-destructive dependency on foreign oil and foreign credit." Perhaps the last of those options would help to reduce terrorism against the United States, but it certainly can not solve the problem alone.
Like it or not, the United States simply must combat terrorism abroad. We have no other choice.
Furthermore, Bacevich argues that the long war has been ineffective and claims that "efforts to spread democracy have either stalled or succeeded only in enhancing the standing of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah." Now, Iraq and Afghanistan may not be model states, but they are certainly more democratic than they were under Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. Perhaps progress in those countries has "stalled," but they have clearly made quite a bit of progress.
Worse, Bacevich fails to offer a real alternative to the "long war." He merely suggests "curbing our appetites, paying our bills and ending our self-destructive dependency on foreign oil and foreign credit." Perhaps the last of those options would help to reduce terrorism against the United States, but it certainly can not solve the problem alone.
Like it or not, the United States simply must combat terrorism abroad. We have no other choice.
Monday, May 19, 2008
So, How Much Does This War Cost?
Chris Duquette recently panned the arguments that Joseph Stiglitz put forth in The Three-Trillion Dollar War claiming that the Iraq War has cost, well, three trillion dollars. ("The Price Of War? Obscuring the Debate with Fuzzy Math," Washington Times, 9 May 2008.) However, Duquette's criticism does not stand up to scrutiny. First off, let me point out that although I have heard of Stiglitz's book, I have not actually read any of it, and I have not made up my mind about Stiglitz's arguments. OK, now let's get to Duquette's criticism.
First, Duquette denies "the charge that the Iraq war has boosted the price of oil on world markets." To support his argument, Duquette merely points out that "Iraq's oil production has returned to pre-war levels." Yet the price of oil depends on many other factors, as well. For example, although Iraq is producing roughly as much oil as it produced before the war, it is doing so under much worse security conditions. Shippers must take greater risks to transport crude from Iraq's southern fields to the Persian Gulf and pay greater rates for insurance. Pipelines face the threat of sabotage and must be secured. Oil infrastructure damaged by wear, sabotage, or fighting needs to be repaired. To be honest, I don't know by how much all of this increases the price of Iraqi oil (or the price of oil on international markets), but Duquette apparently simply ignores these factors. He claims that oil prices have risen "because of a one-two punch of rising global demand and the weakening dollar." I don't deny that these factors have affected prices (and I might also add the lack of sufficient refining capacity), but I imagine that the poor security conditions under which Iraqi oil is produced and transported have contributed to the rise, as well.
Next, Duquette criticizes Stiglitz's argument that "the Iraq war has turned the U.S. economy toward recession." Duquette correctly notes that "economists define a recession as two straight quarters of negative economic growth." Duquette then cites Department of Commerce statistics that real GDP growth for the last three quarters was 4.9 percent, then .6 percent, then .6 percent again. Duquette claims that "that's below trend, but it's not recessionary." True, but according to Duquette, Stiglitz never claimed that the U.S. economy was in a recession, only that it was "turned . . . toward recession." So to me, DOC's statistics appear to support Stiglitz or at least not to strongly contradict him. Furthermore, although Stiglitz and Duquette are both economists, not everyone sticks to the formal definition of "recession." For example, according to a survey conducted by Research Pros Inc. in late February 2008, "a majority of top US executives believe the American economy is already in a recession or will slide into one within six months." ("US Executives Braced for Recession: Poll," Agence France Presse, 6 March 2008.) According to a March 2008 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll, "about three-quarters of all Americans think the economy is now in a recession and the number who feel that way continues to grow." ("CNN Survey: Three out of Four Say U.S. Economy in Recession," Xinhua General News Service, 17 March 2008.) And Berkshire Hathaway chairman and CEO Warren Buffett said in early March "that the U.S. economy is essentially in a recession even if it hasn't met the technical definition of one yet." (Josh Funk, "Buffett Says US Economy Essentially in a Recession, Expects Tough Ride for Insurers," The Associated Press, 3 March 2008.) Whether you want to stick with the formal definition or not, Stiglitz appears to be on solid ground here.
Next, Duquette notes that "the Iraq war's cost . . . equates to 1.0 percent of GDP," implying that the war costs relatively little. Yet one percent is a huge fraction of the national economy. True, other wars have cost more, but that doesn't mean that they were cheap or even a bargain. (Of course, economic costs pale in comparison to human costs, but Stiglitz and Duquette are focusing only on economic costs.) Duquette also points out that "even with the Iraq war, today's defense share of GDP [which he cites as 4.0 percent] is lower than at any point during the Cold War." That hardly reassures me, since I would be appalled if we were spending a greater fraction of GDP on defense now than when we were facing off against a global superpower.
Finally, Duquette complains that "Mr. Stiglitz links the Iraq war to President Bush's tax cuts and faults the two for the increase in the federal budget deficit." Duquette's only criticism of this claim, however, appears to be that "the Iraq war costs $150 billion per year" while "the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts together cost close to twice that." OK, so Duquette is saying that the tax cuts had roughly twice as much of an impact on the budget deficit as the war. I fail to see how that rebuts Stiglitz's claim that both contributed to the increase in the budget deficit.
Let me reiterate that I have not read Stiglitz's book and have no opinion about his arguments. I simply do not know enough about them to judge whether I think that they hold water or not. However, I have read Duquette's rebuttal, and his arguments seem to leak like a sieve.
Next, Duquette criticizes Stiglitz's argument that "the Iraq war has turned the U.S. economy toward recession." Duquette correctly notes that "economists define a recession as two straight quarters of negative economic growth." Duquette then cites Department of Commerce statistics that real GDP growth for the last three quarters was 4.9 percent, then .6 percent, then .6 percent again. Duquette claims that "that's below trend, but it's not recessionary." True, but according to Duquette, Stiglitz never claimed that the U.S. economy was in a recession, only that it was "turned . . . toward recession." So to me, DOC's statistics appear to support Stiglitz or at least not to strongly contradict him. Furthermore, although Stiglitz and Duquette are both economists, not everyone sticks to the formal definition of "recession." For example, according to a survey conducted by Research Pros Inc. in late February 2008, "a majority of top US executives believe the American economy is already in a recession or will slide into one within six months." ("US Executives Braced for Recession: Poll," Agence France Presse, 6 March 2008.) According to a March 2008 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll, "about three-quarters of all Americans think the economy is now in a recession and the number who feel that way continues to grow." ("CNN Survey: Three out of Four Say U.S. Economy in Recession," Xinhua General News Service, 17 March 2008.) And Berkshire Hathaway chairman and CEO Warren Buffett said in early March "that the U.S. economy is essentially in a recession even if it hasn't met the technical definition of one yet." (Josh Funk, "Buffett Says US Economy Essentially in a Recession, Expects Tough Ride for Insurers," The Associated Press, 3 March 2008.) Whether you want to stick with the formal definition or not, Stiglitz appears to be on solid ground here.
Next, Duquette notes that "the Iraq war's cost . . . equates to 1.0 percent of GDP," implying that the war costs relatively little. Yet one percent is a huge fraction of the national economy. True, other wars have cost more, but that doesn't mean that they were cheap or even a bargain. (Of course, economic costs pale in comparison to human costs, but Stiglitz and Duquette are focusing only on economic costs.) Duquette also points out that "even with the Iraq war, today's defense share of GDP [which he cites as 4.0 percent] is lower than at any point during the Cold War." That hardly reassures me, since I would be appalled if we were spending a greater fraction of GDP on defense now than when we were facing off against a global superpower.
Finally, Duquette complains that "Mr. Stiglitz links the Iraq war to President Bush's tax cuts and faults the two for the increase in the federal budget deficit." Duquette's only criticism of this claim, however, appears to be that "the Iraq war costs $150 billion per year" while "the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts together cost close to twice that." OK, so Duquette is saying that the tax cuts had roughly twice as much of an impact on the budget deficit as the war. I fail to see how that rebuts Stiglitz's claim that both contributed to the increase in the budget deficit.
Let me reiterate that I have not read Stiglitz's book and have no opinion about his arguments. I simply do not know enough about them to judge whether I think that they hold water or not. However, I have read Duquette's rebuttal, and his arguments seem to leak like a sieve.
Friday, May 16, 2008
The Caucasian Conundrum
One of the things that occurred during my little hiatus (the recent few weeks during which I failed to update this blog...) was that the tension between Georgia and Russia increased greatly. First, Russia announced an expansion of ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two separatist regions within Georgia. Then Georgia claimed that Russia had shot down a couple of its drones. (Another Georgian drone had been shot down weeks earlier; video appeared to indicate that a Russian aircraft was responsible for that incident.) Most recently, Russia increased the number of its "peacekeepers" in Abkhazia. (It is unclear whether such an increase was permissible. A NATO spokesman said that an increase in Russian forces without Georgia's permission would violate a 1994 agreement, but European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana said that the increase might be within permitted limits. See Stephen Castle, "NATO Accuses Russia of Stirring Tensions in Rebel Georgia Areas," New York Times, 1 May 2008.)
All of this poses a quandary for the United States, since there seem to be few good options. On the one hand, it would like to support Georgia, a struggling post-Soviet democracy strategically located in the Caucasus along the potential route of an important oil pipeline and threatened by its much larger northern neighbor. On the other hand, the United States does not want to antagonize that neighbor and risk war with it. What's a superpower to do?
The answer is that we need to arm Georgia. It is true that I am not a big fan of getting mixed up in disputes in Russia's back yard; for example, I have always opposed the enlargement of NATO into the former Soviet Union. However, there are several reasons for which we should consider selling weapons to Georgia, perhaps at a steep discount.
First, arms sales would signal a U.S. commitment to Georgia after the MAP fiasco. (The United States strongly supported the extension of NATO "membership action plans" to Georgia and Ukraine, but NATO rejected the proposal at its summit in Bucharest, agreeing merely to reconsider the issue at the end of the year.) Although I was glad that the MAP proposal failed, the United States appeared weak, and the result at Bucharest certainly emboldened Russia to act more freely in Georgia.
Second, arms sales would signal displeasure with Russia's recent troop increase. Even if that increase were within permitted limits, it certainly was not helpful.
Third, arms sales would not upset Russia nearly as much as a deployment of NATO forces or the extension of a MAP, since arms transfers do not necessarily imply any permanent involvement or creep into Russia's sphere of influence. (Although arms sales can be a means of exerting influence with another country, a limited sale to Georgia would be unlikely to alarm Russia about any major U.S. presence in the country.)
Fourth, by reminding all parties involved that military action would be counterproductive, an arms transfer might encourage them to find a peaceful solution, such as the reintegration of the breakaway regions into Georgia in exchange for Georgia's agreement not to seek NATO membership. (This solution would probably be the best outcome, in any case. Although Abkhazia and South Ossetia would certainly object, Russia is the actor that really matters. If it agreed to such a solution, then Abkhaza and South Ossetia would have to accept reintegration into Georgia.)
There is one potential problem, however. Russia justified its recent increase of "peacekeepers" by claiming that Georgia was acquiring offensive arms in preparation for an attack on Abkhazia. (Georgia denied the claim.) How could the United States provide weapons to Georgia without giving Russia clear justification for its moves? The answer is that the United States must provide only defensive materiel, such as fixed air defense items. The sale of only defensive arms would limit Georgia's ability to use the items in any offensive against its breakaway regions (which could easily lead to war with Russia). Because such a sale would not significantly increase Georgia's ability to attack these regions, Russia would have a hard time using it to justify any provocative behavior supposedly in defense of the Abkhazians. Furthermore, providing Georgia with defensive arms might dissuade its enemies from mounting any attack upon it. We have already seen the use of Russian air power in Georgia (when a Russian aircraft shot down the first Georgian drone), so an air defense upgrade could greatly improve Georgia's ability to repel any attack.
In a situation in which the United States has few good options, providing a limited amount of defensive arms to Georgia might be the prudent way to support Tbilisi while avoiding any significant escalation in the region and might encourage all parties to work toward a comprehensive solution to Georgia's difficulties.
The answer is that we need to arm Georgia. It is true that I am not a big fan of getting mixed up in disputes in Russia's back yard; for example, I have always opposed the enlargement of NATO into the former Soviet Union. However, there are several reasons for which we should consider selling weapons to Georgia, perhaps at a steep discount.
First, arms sales would signal a U.S. commitment to Georgia after the MAP fiasco. (The United States strongly supported the extension of NATO "membership action plans" to Georgia and Ukraine, but NATO rejected the proposal at its summit in Bucharest, agreeing merely to reconsider the issue at the end of the year.) Although I was glad that the MAP proposal failed, the United States appeared weak, and the result at Bucharest certainly emboldened Russia to act more freely in Georgia.
Second, arms sales would signal displeasure with Russia's recent troop increase. Even if that increase were within permitted limits, it certainly was not helpful.
Third, arms sales would not upset Russia nearly as much as a deployment of NATO forces or the extension of a MAP, since arms transfers do not necessarily imply any permanent involvement or creep into Russia's sphere of influence. (Although arms sales can be a means of exerting influence with another country, a limited sale to Georgia would be unlikely to alarm Russia about any major U.S. presence in the country.)
Fourth, by reminding all parties involved that military action would be counterproductive, an arms transfer might encourage them to find a peaceful solution, such as the reintegration of the breakaway regions into Georgia in exchange for Georgia's agreement not to seek NATO membership. (This solution would probably be the best outcome, in any case. Although Abkhazia and South Ossetia would certainly object, Russia is the actor that really matters. If it agreed to such a solution, then Abkhaza and South Ossetia would have to accept reintegration into Georgia.)
There is one potential problem, however. Russia justified its recent increase of "peacekeepers" by claiming that Georgia was acquiring offensive arms in preparation for an attack on Abkhazia. (Georgia denied the claim.) How could the United States provide weapons to Georgia without giving Russia clear justification for its moves? The answer is that the United States must provide only defensive materiel, such as fixed air defense items. The sale of only defensive arms would limit Georgia's ability to use the items in any offensive against its breakaway regions (which could easily lead to war with Russia). Because such a sale would not significantly increase Georgia's ability to attack these regions, Russia would have a hard time using it to justify any provocative behavior supposedly in defense of the Abkhazians. Furthermore, providing Georgia with defensive arms might dissuade its enemies from mounting any attack upon it. We have already seen the use of Russian air power in Georgia (when a Russian aircraft shot down the first Georgian drone), so an air defense upgrade could greatly improve Georgia's ability to repel any attack.
In a situation in which the United States has few good options, providing a limited amount of defensive arms to Georgia might be the prudent way to support Tbilisi while avoiding any significant escalation in the region and might encourage all parties to work toward a comprehensive solution to Georgia's difficulties.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
DOD Tries to Provide the News Abroad ... Again ...
So it's been a little while since I updated this thing... but hey, it's not like anything's been happening in the world, right? Well, I actually got really busy and am still catching up with the news, so today's entry responds to events from a couple of weeks ago.
On 1 May, USA Today carried a story describing the Department of Defense's creation of new news websites for foreign audiences (Peter Eisler, "Pentagon Starts Foreign News Sites; Journalism Groups Call Sites Deceptive Effort to Control Message Abroad," 1 May 2008). The title basically gets right to the controversy: is the Pentagon deceiving people who visit these sites?
First, let me point out that no-one appears to be claiming that the sites contain disinformation. DOD does appear to be trying to present facts, or at least information that it considers to be truthful.
How, then, might the department be deceiving readers? First, the fact that DOD supports the sites is not obvious. For example, on www.mawtani.com (the DOD news website for Iraqis), visitors have to click on an "about" link to discover DOD's sponsorship. Critics claim that few visitors are likely to click on such a link; many more will likely assume the site's content to have been provided by an independent news organization.
Second, while DOD does not appear to be planting false information on the sites, there is simply no such thing as completely objective news. Editors always skew how information is presented, even if only by deciding which stories to include and which to omit. A few years ago, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggested that only journalists who "will not reflect discredit on the U.S. government" should be hired for the websites (see Barbara Starr and Larry Shaughnessy, "Pentagon Sites: Journalism or Propaganda?," cnn.com, 5 February 2005). One has to wonder, then, what kind of example the United States is setting for other countries and whether the information on these websites is truly objective or is merely propaganda.
Yet there are still more reasons to object to these websites. First, we have to wonder, what is the Pentagon providing that other websites aren't? Is there really such a dearth of websites providing news to Iraqis? A similar website is being built for Latin America. Are Latin Americans really unable to get news on the internet currently?
Second, even if such an effort were necessary, why would DOD be in charge of it? These websites will cover general news, not just defense or security issues. Developing news websites appears to be well outside of DOD's mandate, especially since the United States already has a very capable organization (the Broadcasting Board of Governors) with extensive experience providing news to foreign audiences.
Finally, DOD can only get bad PR from this effort. No-one will be writing letters to Secretary Gates thanking him for finally bringing the news to information-starved Iraqis. On the other hand, this program can easily remind critics of DOD's previous public diplomacy missteps, such as its payment to Iraqi journalists for favorable news stories (the Lincoln Group scandal) and the short-lived Office of Strategic Influence. Notwithstanding the actual merits of those earlier efforts, many people will certainly associate the current websites with those projects and once again accuse DOD of spreading disinformation and propaganda.
DOD ought to get out of the news business and stick to its core competency. If there really is a need for websites to provide news to foreign audiences, then let the BBG handle it.
On 1 May, USA Today carried a story describing the Department of Defense's creation of new news websites for foreign audiences (Peter Eisler, "Pentagon Starts Foreign News Sites; Journalism Groups Call Sites Deceptive Effort to Control Message Abroad," 1 May 2008). The title basically gets right to the controversy: is the Pentagon deceiving people who visit these sites?
First, let me point out that no-one appears to be claiming that the sites contain disinformation. DOD does appear to be trying to present facts, or at least information that it considers to be truthful.
How, then, might the department be deceiving readers? First, the fact that DOD supports the sites is not obvious. For example, on www.mawtani.com (the DOD news website for Iraqis), visitors have to click on an "about" link to discover DOD's sponsorship. Critics claim that few visitors are likely to click on such a link; many more will likely assume the site's content to have been provided by an independent news organization.
Second, while DOD does not appear to be planting false information on the sites, there is simply no such thing as completely objective news. Editors always skew how information is presented, even if only by deciding which stories to include and which to omit. A few years ago, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggested that only journalists who "will not reflect discredit on the U.S. government" should be hired for the websites (see Barbara Starr and Larry Shaughnessy, "Pentagon Sites: Journalism or Propaganda?," cnn.com, 5 February 2005). One has to wonder, then, what kind of example the United States is setting for other countries and whether the information on these websites is truly objective or is merely propaganda.
Yet there are still more reasons to object to these websites. First, we have to wonder, what is the Pentagon providing that other websites aren't? Is there really such a dearth of websites providing news to Iraqis? A similar website is being built for Latin America. Are Latin Americans really unable to get news on the internet currently?
Second, even if such an effort were necessary, why would DOD be in charge of it? These websites will cover general news, not just defense or security issues. Developing news websites appears to be well outside of DOD's mandate, especially since the United States already has a very capable organization (the Broadcasting Board of Governors) with extensive experience providing news to foreign audiences.
Finally, DOD can only get bad PR from this effort. No-one will be writing letters to Secretary Gates thanking him for finally bringing the news to information-starved Iraqis. On the other hand, this program can easily remind critics of DOD's previous public diplomacy missteps, such as its payment to Iraqi journalists for favorable news stories (the Lincoln Group scandal) and the short-lived Office of Strategic Influence. Notwithstanding the actual merits of those earlier efforts, many people will certainly associate the current websites with those projects and once again accuse DOD of spreading disinformation and propaganda.
DOD ought to get out of the news business and stick to its core competency. If there really is a need for websites to provide news to foreign audiences, then let the BBG handle it.
Monday, April 21, 2008
A Matter of Intent
Global Security Newswire recently reported that "a British expert is calling on the international community to more effectively discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons by punishing any and all breaches of agreed safeguards, without first trying to determine intent" (Elaine M. Grossman, "Proliferation Analyst Discourages Focus on Intent," 10 April 2008, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2008_4_10.html#174E9315). James Acton, of King's College in London, says that "international sanctions—whether enacted through the IAEA Board of Governors or the [U.N.] Security Council—should be based on what a noncompliant state has done, not on why it acted."
Punishing states based on demonstrated violations rather than intent would have some advantages. For one thing, it would greatly simplify the enforcement of nonproliferation standards. The early stages of a nuclear weapons development program almost always appear identical to the early stages of a civilian nuclear energy development program: either the extraction, processing, and enrichment of uranium or (more rarely) the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from a civilian reactor in order to recover plutonium. Because of the "dual use" nature of these activities, it is often unclear whether states' nuclear efforts are meant for civilian or military purposes.
However, there are reasons for which judicial systems all over the world consider intent when rendering verdicts and imposing sentences. First, demonstration of intent is often necessary to prohibit undesirable activities. For example, if two people are out hunting and one shoots at the other, trying to kill him, then it would be very hard for a prosecutor to get a conviction without demonstrating intent. If the shooter were trying to hit a deer, then he was hunting; if he were trying to hit his friend, then he was committing attempted murder.
This has direct application for nuclear nonproliferation. The famous "loophole" of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows countries to develop various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, becoming what some call "virtual nuclear weapons states," able to develop nuclear weapons on relatively short notice. (There is a debate over the extent to which the NPT allows or even requires access to the full nuclear fuel cycle; however, since Japan engages in both uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, there seems to be little disagreement that non-nuclear weapon states are at least in general allowed to engage in all aspects of the cycle.) If we ignore intent, then these "virtual nuclear weapons states" may develop uranium enrichment and plutonium recovery technology only to withdraw from the NPT and then complete the relatively easy remaining steps to develop nuclear weapons. In fact, that is almost exactly what North Korea did before detonating its first nuclear device in 2006.
Second, judicial systems consider intent in order to determine sentences. Clearly the person who speeds because his wife needs to get to the hospital in order to give birth should not be given the same sentence as the person who speeds because he is drag-racing. (I actually believe that some legal codes waive speeding penalties in case of medical emergency, but you get the point.) Acton says that "if I was a state that was out developing nuclear weapons at the moment, I would take away from all of this is that if I ever get caught by the IAEA, what I should do is I should play the motives card. The best way of . . . avoiding sanctions will be to say . . . 'I didn’t break the rules because I'm building a nuclear weapon. I broke the rules because I'm worried that if I declared my enrichment program, then I would get bombed by some other state.'" (That, of course, was basically Iran's argument when its clandestine nuclear program was discovered.) However, I doubt that such an argument would convince a reasonable jury to reduce the defendant's sentence significantly. A truly objective jury might not even buy the story at all, depending on the specific circumstances.
Third, judicial systems consider intent in order to avoid punishing parties who violated laws through no fault of their own. For example, if driver A rear-ends driver B, causing driver B to rear-end driver C, then clearly driver B should not be held legally at fault. Similar things happen with international nonproliferation treaties. For example, Albania signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, and the treaty came into force in 1997. Several years later (sources variously give 2002, 2003, or 2004) the government discovered a cache of chemical weapons acquired by a previous government, probably in the mid-1970s (although no documentation was found to indicate exactly how it was acquired). The government immediately reported the discovery to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and destroyed the entire stockpile by 2007. Although the country was technically in violation of its treaty requirements from 1997 until at least 2002, no reasonable person would suggest that the government should be faulted for this incident. Similar concerns exist with the NPT. For example, if the North Korean government collapsed and the country were unified under the Republic of Korea's (ROK's) government, what would happen to the North's nuclear arsenal? If it remained on Korean soil, even temporarily, then the ROK (now exercising sovereignty over the entire peninsula) might be considered in violation of its NPT obligation not to possess nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, few reasonable people would want to punish Seoul for such a technical, unintentional violation of the treaty. (In fact, many people would probably be happy for Seoul to take possession of and secure the "loose nukes," at least until they could be disposed of in an appropriate manner.)
Acton does make a couple of interesting arguments against considering intent. First, he points out that under the current system, influential countries can get charges against their friends dismissed. He is right in claiming that South Korea "conducted undeclared reprocessing experiments that were, in both the letter and the spirit, contrary to the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It should have been found in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement and it should have been punished appropriately." However, the appropriate solution for such problems is to convince states that applying nonproliferation standards impartially is in their long-term interest, not to reform the enforcement process to disregard intent.
Second, Acton believes that discussion of intent obscures clearly demonstrable violations of international legal prohibitions. According to the article, "Acton suggested that such discussions divert critical attention away from Tehran's actual conduct in violation of international law." Had the United States, Britain, and France "stopped talking about intent so much in the Board of Governors and the IAEA, it would have been much harder for China and Russia, for instance, to jump on the intent bandwagon," Acton said. "If our argument had been Iran should have sanctions enacted on it because it's violated its safeguards agreement, the argument would have been a much stronger one over the long run."
It is true that Iran violated its safeguards agreement, but the United Nations already imposed (relatively weak) sanctions on Tehran for that infraction. Acton is missing the point of why intent forms such an integral part of the Bush administration's case against Iran: demonstrating violation of a safeguards agreement generates a slap on the wrist, while demonstrating intent to develop nuclear weapons is what could potentially generate support in the Security Council for real measures against Iran. That is why the Bush administration is, for example, making a big deal out of Iran's development of long-range missiles; although their development violates no legal prohibition, it provides evidence of Iran's intention to develop nuclear weapons (since conventional explosives make a poor choice of warhead for them).
I do not mean to claim that the current system is perfect; far from it. However, other fixes, similar to certain measures used in the U.S. legal system, are more appropriate. For example, Congress provides sentencing guidelines for federal courts. The United Nations Security Council could do something similar for violations of the NPT, suggesting appropriate ranges of sanctions for certain infractions.
Similarly, Congress delegates some lawmaking authority to the executive branch; for example, the Food and Drug Administration is allowed to impose certain requirements on food producers and drug manufacturers. The Security Council could delegate some enforcement capability to the IAEA, rather than requiring it to refer violations to the council for action. The IAEA could, then, impose minor penalties for relatively minor violations on its own; more significant violations, requiring larger penalties, would still be referred to the council.
Such reforms could greatly improve enforcement of the NPT. Simply ignoring intent would be a mistake.
Punishing states based on demonstrated violations rather than intent would have some advantages. For one thing, it would greatly simplify the enforcement of nonproliferation standards. The early stages of a nuclear weapons development program almost always appear identical to the early stages of a civilian nuclear energy development program: either the extraction, processing, and enrichment of uranium or (more rarely) the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from a civilian reactor in order to recover plutonium. Because of the "dual use" nature of these activities, it is often unclear whether states' nuclear efforts are meant for civilian or military purposes.
However, there are reasons for which judicial systems all over the world consider intent when rendering verdicts and imposing sentences. First, demonstration of intent is often necessary to prohibit undesirable activities. For example, if two people are out hunting and one shoots at the other, trying to kill him, then it would be very hard for a prosecutor to get a conviction without demonstrating intent. If the shooter were trying to hit a deer, then he was hunting; if he were trying to hit his friend, then he was committing attempted murder.
This has direct application for nuclear nonproliferation. The famous "loophole" of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows countries to develop various aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, becoming what some call "virtual nuclear weapons states," able to develop nuclear weapons on relatively short notice. (There is a debate over the extent to which the NPT allows or even requires access to the full nuclear fuel cycle; however, since Japan engages in both uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, there seems to be little disagreement that non-nuclear weapon states are at least in general allowed to engage in all aspects of the cycle.) If we ignore intent, then these "virtual nuclear weapons states" may develop uranium enrichment and plutonium recovery technology only to withdraw from the NPT and then complete the relatively easy remaining steps to develop nuclear weapons. In fact, that is almost exactly what North Korea did before detonating its first nuclear device in 2006.
Second, judicial systems consider intent in order to determine sentences. Clearly the person who speeds because his wife needs to get to the hospital in order to give birth should not be given the same sentence as the person who speeds because he is drag-racing. (I actually believe that some legal codes waive speeding penalties in case of medical emergency, but you get the point.) Acton says that "if I was a state that was out developing nuclear weapons at the moment, I would take away from all of this is that if I ever get caught by the IAEA, what I should do is I should play the motives card. The best way of . . . avoiding sanctions will be to say . . . 'I didn’t break the rules because I'm building a nuclear weapon. I broke the rules because I'm worried that if I declared my enrichment program, then I would get bombed by some other state.'" (That, of course, was basically Iran's argument when its clandestine nuclear program was discovered.) However, I doubt that such an argument would convince a reasonable jury to reduce the defendant's sentence significantly. A truly objective jury might not even buy the story at all, depending on the specific circumstances.
Third, judicial systems consider intent in order to avoid punishing parties who violated laws through no fault of their own. For example, if driver A rear-ends driver B, causing driver B to rear-end driver C, then clearly driver B should not be held legally at fault. Similar things happen with international nonproliferation treaties. For example, Albania signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, and the treaty came into force in 1997. Several years later (sources variously give 2002, 2003, or 2004) the government discovered a cache of chemical weapons acquired by a previous government, probably in the mid-1970s (although no documentation was found to indicate exactly how it was acquired). The government immediately reported the discovery to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and destroyed the entire stockpile by 2007. Although the country was technically in violation of its treaty requirements from 1997 until at least 2002, no reasonable person would suggest that the government should be faulted for this incident. Similar concerns exist with the NPT. For example, if the North Korean government collapsed and the country were unified under the Republic of Korea's (ROK's) government, what would happen to the North's nuclear arsenal? If it remained on Korean soil, even temporarily, then the ROK (now exercising sovereignty over the entire peninsula) might be considered in violation of its NPT obligation not to possess nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, few reasonable people would want to punish Seoul for such a technical, unintentional violation of the treaty. (In fact, many people would probably be happy for Seoul to take possession of and secure the "loose nukes," at least until they could be disposed of in an appropriate manner.)
Acton does make a couple of interesting arguments against considering intent. First, he points out that under the current system, influential countries can get charges against their friends dismissed. He is right in claiming that South Korea "conducted undeclared reprocessing experiments that were, in both the letter and the spirit, contrary to the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It should have been found in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement and it should have been punished appropriately." However, the appropriate solution for such problems is to convince states that applying nonproliferation standards impartially is in their long-term interest, not to reform the enforcement process to disregard intent.
Second, Acton believes that discussion of intent obscures clearly demonstrable violations of international legal prohibitions. According to the article, "Acton suggested that such discussions divert critical attention away from Tehran's actual conduct in violation of international law." Had the United States, Britain, and France "stopped talking about intent so much in the Board of Governors and the IAEA, it would have been much harder for China and Russia, for instance, to jump on the intent bandwagon," Acton said. "If our argument had been Iran should have sanctions enacted on it because it's violated its safeguards agreement, the argument would have been a much stronger one over the long run."
It is true that Iran violated its safeguards agreement, but the United Nations already imposed (relatively weak) sanctions on Tehran for that infraction. Acton is missing the point of why intent forms such an integral part of the Bush administration's case against Iran: demonstrating violation of a safeguards agreement generates a slap on the wrist, while demonstrating intent to develop nuclear weapons is what could potentially generate support in the Security Council for real measures against Iran. That is why the Bush administration is, for example, making a big deal out of Iran's development of long-range missiles; although their development violates no legal prohibition, it provides evidence of Iran's intention to develop nuclear weapons (since conventional explosives make a poor choice of warhead for them).
I do not mean to claim that the current system is perfect; far from it. However, other fixes, similar to certain measures used in the U.S. legal system, are more appropriate. For example, Congress provides sentencing guidelines for federal courts. The United Nations Security Council could do something similar for violations of the NPT, suggesting appropriate ranges of sanctions for certain infractions.
Similarly, Congress delegates some lawmaking authority to the executive branch; for example, the Food and Drug Administration is allowed to impose certain requirements on food producers and drug manufacturers. The Security Council could delegate some enforcement capability to the IAEA, rather than requiring it to refer violations to the council for action. The IAEA could, then, impose minor penalties for relatively minor violations on its own; more significant violations, requiring larger penalties, would still be referred to the council.
Such reforms could greatly improve enforcement of the NPT. Simply ignoring intent would be a mistake.
Sunday, April 20, 2008
Deterring the Undeterrable (Part Two or Three)
Well, Charles Krauthammer has revisited his earlier op-ed ("Deterring the Undeterrable," Washington Post, 18 April 2008, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/17/AR2008041703165.html). (See my previous post on the subject.) And, yes, I am thinking of suing him for appropriating my title.
In his new piece, Krauthammer clarifies his position on whether Iran is deterrable or not. He now states that "with its current millenarian leadership, deterrence is indeed a feeble gamble, as I wrote in 2006 in making the case for considering preemption. [I referred to this Washington Post piece in my previous post.] But if preemption is off the table, deterrence is all you've got. Our task is to make deterrence in this context less feeble." So the conclusion seems to be that the Iranian leadership is largely but not completely irrational; that deterrence, therefore, has a slim chance of working; and that because we have so few other options, our best bet is to maximize the chances that it would work. Finally, Krauthammer's calculus seems rational to me. I don't agree with it, but at least now I understand his argument.
I don't agree with Krauthammer because I don't buy his premise that "there are four ways to deal with rogue states going nuclear: preemption, deterrence, missile defense and regime change." For example, when Belarus inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, other countries succeeded in persuading it to give up these weapons. Was that an example of preemption, deterrence, missile defense, or regime change? Clearly none of the above. (Regime change certainly played a role, although foreign pressure was still necessary.)
I prefer to focus instead on "the five D's": denial, dissuasion (including deterrence), defeat, and defense. Krauthammer believes that Iran can not be stopped from developing nuclear weapons and that deterrence and missile defense are the only methods to prevent it from striking at the United States (or Israel, which was the focus of the first op-ed but is almost entirely absent from this one). I still have hope that denial, other forms of dissuasion (besides deterrence), defeat, and other forms of defense (besides missile defense) may be effective in countering Iran's nuclear weapons effort and may even prevent it from acquiring such weapons in the first place.
Denial may still be effective in at least delaying Iran's nuclear weapons program. The country seems to be facing significant difficulty in enriching uranium; its P-1 centrifuges are operating far below capacity, and it has only recently begun to experiment with P-2 and IR-2 centrifuges. (Reports are not entirely clear, but it appears that Iran has recently begun to operate some of the more advanced types of centrifuge only on a pilot, not production, scale.) Furthermore, Iran has not yet succeeded in developing long-range missiles capable of striking the United States or miniaturizing nuclear warheads to fit on these missiles. (Iran could try other means of delivery, such as smuggling nuclear weapons into the United States, but it would probably prefer a long-range delivery capability.) Therefore, although Iran could probably eventually succeed in these endeavors on its own, denying it technical expertise and access to key items could at least delay its efforts.
Second, the United States still might be able to dissuade Iran from going nuclear. Many Iranians oppose the development of nuclear weapons, for various reasons. Ayatollah Khomenei declared nuclear weapons to be un-Islamic, creating a powerful moral argument against them. Their development would require (and has required) a significant investment, diverting resources from other pressing needs, creating a strong economic argument against them. Furthermore, acquiring nuclear weapons might actually put Iran in a more precarious security situation, weakening ties with countries such as Russia (which greatly fears the transfer of such weapons to Islamic terrorists) and possibly spurring other Middle Eastern states (such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey) to acquire their own nuclear arsenals, creating a strong security argument against them. Therefore, the United States and others still have an opportunity to dissuade Iran from going nuclear.
Third, although Krauthammer claims that "preemption works but, as a remedy, it is spent," defeat of the Iranian threat is still an option. It is true that the results of the U.S. invasion of Iraq (failure to find evidence of active unconventional weapons programs and the subsequent insurgency) and the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program greatly reduced U.S. options for launching a preemptive attack on Iran. However, if it poses a significant threat to U.S. security, then the next president must continue to consider such a strike as an option. An attack on Iranian nuclear weapons development facilities would probably not prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon but could set the program back by a decade. (This scenario would probably fall into the "denial," not "defeat," category.) If Iran did acquire a limited number of nuclear weapons and the United States had credible intelligence about their location, a strike could eliminate the threat and would have much greater support than the invasion of Iraq did. (In fact, support would probably be plentiful from the Arab world, which has little interest in seeing an Iranian nuclear arsenal.)
Finally, although I do not believe that defensive measures are likely to prevent Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, they may limit the consequences of any attack. As Krauthammer notes, active defenses, such as missile defenses (if they work), may be effective in limiting the number of weapons that reach U.S. or allied soil and may even convince Iran not to attack in the first place (thus acting as a form of dissuasion). However, passive defenses, including collective defenses (such as bomb shelters) and individual defense (such as MOP suits), can also help to protect U.S. forces abroad and populations of states at high risk of Iranian attack (such as Israel). In addition, the United States has done woefully little to prepare for the aftermath of a nuclear explosion. The government must devote greater resources into managing the consequences of any such attack, either at home or abroad.
With Krauthammer's new op-ed piece, I sort of get where he's coming from. Now I understand his argument about the need to deter Iran from launching an attack against the United States. However, I believe that we can still prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place and that we have more tools at our disposal than only deterrence and missile defense.
In his new piece, Krauthammer clarifies his position on whether Iran is deterrable or not. He now states that "with its current millenarian leadership, deterrence is indeed a feeble gamble, as I wrote in 2006 in making the case for considering preemption. [I referred to this Washington Post piece in my previous post.] But if preemption is off the table, deterrence is all you've got. Our task is to make deterrence in this context less feeble." So the conclusion seems to be that the Iranian leadership is largely but not completely irrational; that deterrence, therefore, has a slim chance of working; and that because we have so few other options, our best bet is to maximize the chances that it would work. Finally, Krauthammer's calculus seems rational to me. I don't agree with it, but at least now I understand his argument.
I don't agree with Krauthammer because I don't buy his premise that "there are four ways to deal with rogue states going nuclear: preemption, deterrence, missile defense and regime change." For example, when Belarus inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, other countries succeeded in persuading it to give up these weapons. Was that an example of preemption, deterrence, missile defense, or regime change? Clearly none of the above. (Regime change certainly played a role, although foreign pressure was still necessary.)
I prefer to focus instead on "the five D's": denial, dissuasion (including deterrence), defeat, and defense. Krauthammer believes that Iran can not be stopped from developing nuclear weapons and that deterrence and missile defense are the only methods to prevent it from striking at the United States (or Israel, which was the focus of the first op-ed but is almost entirely absent from this one). I still have hope that denial, other forms of dissuasion (besides deterrence), defeat, and other forms of defense (besides missile defense) may be effective in countering Iran's nuclear weapons effort and may even prevent it from acquiring such weapons in the first place.
Denial may still be effective in at least delaying Iran's nuclear weapons program. The country seems to be facing significant difficulty in enriching uranium; its P-1 centrifuges are operating far below capacity, and it has only recently begun to experiment with P-2 and IR-2 centrifuges. (Reports are not entirely clear, but it appears that Iran has recently begun to operate some of the more advanced types of centrifuge only on a pilot, not production, scale.) Furthermore, Iran has not yet succeeded in developing long-range missiles capable of striking the United States or miniaturizing nuclear warheads to fit on these missiles. (Iran could try other means of delivery, such as smuggling nuclear weapons into the United States, but it would probably prefer a long-range delivery capability.) Therefore, although Iran could probably eventually succeed in these endeavors on its own, denying it technical expertise and access to key items could at least delay its efforts.
Second, the United States still might be able to dissuade Iran from going nuclear. Many Iranians oppose the development of nuclear weapons, for various reasons. Ayatollah Khomenei declared nuclear weapons to be un-Islamic, creating a powerful moral argument against them. Their development would require (and has required) a significant investment, diverting resources from other pressing needs, creating a strong economic argument against them. Furthermore, acquiring nuclear weapons might actually put Iran in a more precarious security situation, weakening ties with countries such as Russia (which greatly fears the transfer of such weapons to Islamic terrorists) and possibly spurring other Middle Eastern states (such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey) to acquire their own nuclear arsenals, creating a strong security argument against them. Therefore, the United States and others still have an opportunity to dissuade Iran from going nuclear.
Third, although Krauthammer claims that "preemption works but, as a remedy, it is spent," defeat of the Iranian threat is still an option. It is true that the results of the U.S. invasion of Iraq (failure to find evidence of active unconventional weapons programs and the subsequent insurgency) and the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program greatly reduced U.S. options for launching a preemptive attack on Iran. However, if it poses a significant threat to U.S. security, then the next president must continue to consider such a strike as an option. An attack on Iranian nuclear weapons development facilities would probably not prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon but could set the program back by a decade. (This scenario would probably fall into the "denial," not "defeat," category.) If Iran did acquire a limited number of nuclear weapons and the United States had credible intelligence about their location, a strike could eliminate the threat and would have much greater support than the invasion of Iraq did. (In fact, support would probably be plentiful from the Arab world, which has little interest in seeing an Iranian nuclear arsenal.)
Finally, although I do not believe that defensive measures are likely to prevent Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, they may limit the consequences of any attack. As Krauthammer notes, active defenses, such as missile defenses (if they work), may be effective in limiting the number of weapons that reach U.S. or allied soil and may even convince Iran not to attack in the first place (thus acting as a form of dissuasion). However, passive defenses, including collective defenses (such as bomb shelters) and individual defense (such as MOP suits), can also help to protect U.S. forces abroad and populations of states at high risk of Iranian attack (such as Israel). In addition, the United States has done woefully little to prepare for the aftermath of a nuclear explosion. The government must devote greater resources into managing the consequences of any such attack, either at home or abroad.
With Krauthammer's new op-ed piece, I sort of get where he's coming from. Now I understand his argument about the need to deter Iran from launching an attack against the United States. However, I believe that we can still prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place and that we have more tools at our disposal than only deterrence and missile defense.
Saturday, April 12, 2008
Deterring the Undeterrable?
Charles Krauthammer recently wrote a Washington Post op-ed piece ("The Holocaust Declaration," 11 April 2008, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/10/AR2008041003271.html) in which he argued that the United States should declare that it would retaliate against Iran if it launched a nuclear attack against Israel. Krauthammer hopes that such a declaration would deter Iran but that acknowledges that "this will be even more difficult than during the Cold War, when we were dealing with rational actors." Yet the last time I checked, effective deterrence requires rational actors. The target of deterrence must value something (e.g., his security) and then be able to comprehend that if he took some action, then some kind of punishment would be inflicted upon him (e.g., that he would be attacked). Based on this analysis, he must decide that taking such action would not be worth the consequences. That is rational behavior.
It would probably be quite difficult to deter an irrational actor. For example, some people claim that Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has spoken with messianic zeal about hastening the return of the 9th-century "hidden imam" (or Mahdi), is not entirely rational and might instigate war in order to effect the return of the Mahdi, even if doing so brought about severe retaliation against Iran. (Although one could claim that this kind of behavior was rational if Ahmadinejad valued the Mahdi's return above the well-being of the Iranian people, this kind of rationality is probably not what Krauthammer was talking about and certainly would not be useful for implementing a policy of deterrence.)
So does Krauthammer believe that Iran's leadership is irrational, which would call into question whether the United States can implement a policy of deterrence, or does he believe that it is rational, in which case implementing such a policy ought to be as easy as during the Cold War? (In fact, as Krauthammer himself notes, it should be even easier, since the United States would face relatively little threat of Iranian retaliation and therefore feel less constrained in attacking Iran.)
He tries to deal with this contradiction in the third-to-last paragraph of the piece. He acknowledges that "it is, of course, hardly certain that deterrence would work on the likes of Ahmadinejad and other jihadists," apparently claiming that Ahmadinejad is an irrational actor. He therefore tries to reconcile this issue by suggesting that "deterrence would concentrate the minds of rational Iranian actors, of whom there are many, to restrain or even depose leaders such as Ahmadinejad."
However, Krauthammer's simplistic argument fails to address several gaps. When might rational elements within Iranian society (or rather, presumably, the Iranian government) get around to restraining or deposing their president? Even if they wanted to, would they have the capability to do so? What happens in the meantime? Do we just sit around hoping that deterrence works on Ahmadinejad? And what about Ayatollah Khamenei, the ultimate authority within Iran? Does Krauthammer consider him to be rational? What would happen if we managed to deter one faction within the Iranian government but not another?
Don't get me wrong; I actually believe that Iran's leadership in general is quite rational and deterrable. However, there are many more factors in play than Krauthammer considers. For one thing, several elements of the Iranian government are involved in military decisionmaking, including the supreme leader, the president, and the supreme national security council. Furthermore, it is unclear how the decision to employ nuclear weapons would be made. Iran almost certainly has not developed any doctrine for their employment and does not seem to have ever used chemical or biological weapons. (There are some questions about whether Iran used chemical weapons during the war with Iraq in the 1980s, but this has never been proven.) It should also be noted that the extent of Ahmadinejad's authority over Iranian forces that might employ such weapons, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, is unclear.
Therefore, while I agree that it might be possible to deter Iran, any policy to do so would require a much more thorough analysis than Krauthammer has provided. (I guess the Washington Post only gives you so much room for an op-ed, though.) I also think that Krauthammer gives up a bit too early on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. If we are able to make progress in this area soon, then perhaps we wouldn't have to worry about deterring Iran after all.
Update: On 15 September 2006 Krauthammer wrote ("The Tehran Calculus," Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/14/AR2006091401413_pf.html) that Iran currently "is deterred from overt aggression against its neighbors by the threat of conventional retaliation. Against a nuclear Iran, such deterrence becomes far less credible. . . . Against millenarian fanaticism glorying in a cult of death, deterrence is a mere wish. Is the West prepared to wager its cities with their millions of inhabitants on that feeble gamble?" Kudos to "The Plank" at the New Republic (http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2008/04/11/so-iran-is-deterrable-after-all.aspx") for digging this up.
It would probably be quite difficult to deter an irrational actor. For example, some people claim that Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has spoken with messianic zeal about hastening the return of the 9th-century "hidden imam" (or Mahdi), is not entirely rational and might instigate war in order to effect the return of the Mahdi, even if doing so brought about severe retaliation against Iran. (Although one could claim that this kind of behavior was rational if Ahmadinejad valued the Mahdi's return above the well-being of the Iranian people, this kind of rationality is probably not what Krauthammer was talking about and certainly would not be useful for implementing a policy of deterrence.)
So does Krauthammer believe that Iran's leadership is irrational, which would call into question whether the United States can implement a policy of deterrence, or does he believe that it is rational, in which case implementing such a policy ought to be as easy as during the Cold War? (In fact, as Krauthammer himself notes, it should be even easier, since the United States would face relatively little threat of Iranian retaliation and therefore feel less constrained in attacking Iran.)
He tries to deal with this contradiction in the third-to-last paragraph of the piece. He acknowledges that "it is, of course, hardly certain that deterrence would work on the likes of Ahmadinejad and other jihadists," apparently claiming that Ahmadinejad is an irrational actor. He therefore tries to reconcile this issue by suggesting that "deterrence would concentrate the minds of rational Iranian actors, of whom there are many, to restrain or even depose leaders such as Ahmadinejad."
However, Krauthammer's simplistic argument fails to address several gaps. When might rational elements within Iranian society (or rather, presumably, the Iranian government) get around to restraining or deposing their president? Even if they wanted to, would they have the capability to do so? What happens in the meantime? Do we just sit around hoping that deterrence works on Ahmadinejad? And what about Ayatollah Khamenei, the ultimate authority within Iran? Does Krauthammer consider him to be rational? What would happen if we managed to deter one faction within the Iranian government but not another?
Don't get me wrong; I actually believe that Iran's leadership in general is quite rational and deterrable. However, there are many more factors in play than Krauthammer considers. For one thing, several elements of the Iranian government are involved in military decisionmaking, including the supreme leader, the president, and the supreme national security council. Furthermore, it is unclear how the decision to employ nuclear weapons would be made. Iran almost certainly has not developed any doctrine for their employment and does not seem to have ever used chemical or biological weapons. (There are some questions about whether Iran used chemical weapons during the war with Iraq in the 1980s, but this has never been proven.) It should also be noted that the extent of Ahmadinejad's authority over Iranian forces that might employ such weapons, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, is unclear.
Therefore, while I agree that it might be possible to deter Iran, any policy to do so would require a much more thorough analysis than Krauthammer has provided. (I guess the Washington Post only gives you so much room for an op-ed, though.) I also think that Krauthammer gives up a bit too early on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. If we are able to make progress in this area soon, then perhaps we wouldn't have to worry about deterring Iran after all.
Update: On 15 September 2006 Krauthammer wrote ("The Tehran Calculus," Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/14/AR2006091401413_pf.html) that Iran currently "is deterred from overt aggression against its neighbors by the threat of conventional retaliation. Against a nuclear Iran, such deterrence becomes far less credible. . . . Against millenarian fanaticism glorying in a cult of death, deterrence is a mere wish. Is the West prepared to wager its cities with their millions of inhabitants on that feeble gamble?" Kudos to "The Plank" at the New Republic (http://blogs.tnr.com/tnr/blogs/the_plank/archive/2008/04/11/so-iran-is-deterrable-after-all.aspx") for digging this up.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Why Do Americans from the Smallest States Die at a Higher Rate in Iraq?
In a recent piece in USA Today ("Why Smallest States Suffer Most In Iraq," 28 March 2008, at http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/03/why-smallest-st.html), Al Neuharth claims that a disproportionate number of deaths in the Iraq war come from states with the smallest populations and that two reasons explain this phenomenon: first, Americans from the smallest states earn less, and second, they are more patriotic. As a result of these two factors, Americans from the smallest states are, presumably, more likely to join the military and therefore to be killed in Iraq.
Neuharth provides numbers demonstrating a huge disparity between the "death rates" of the largest and smallest states. I have no way of independently analyzing these numbers, so I'll accept that they are correct. However, I don't buy the two supposed reasons for the disparity.
First, Neuharth claims that Americans from the smallest states earn less than those from the biggest. However, according to the Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income06/statemhi2.html), the median household incomes of the union's five smallest states:
compare quite well with those of the five biggest states:
Second, Neuharth claims that residents of the smallest states are more patriotic than those from the biggest, but he provides no evidence for this statement. Perhaps he is basing it on intuition? I suppose that there are many ways to measure patriotism—the number of Americans who fly U.S. flags on their homes or who have memorized the pledge of allegiance, perhaps—but doubt that there is any single method that most people would agree on. In any case, I—based on intuition—doubt that residents of the union's smallest states are demonstrably more patriotic than those from the biggest.
Yet even if we accepted both of Neuharth's premises, his argument would still be flawed. He appears to suggest that the disparities in income and patriotism lead more Americans from the smallest states to join the military, resulting in a greater number of deaths in Iraq. However, while a greater proportion of Americans from the smallest states do, in fact, appear to join the military, this moderate difference does not seem to account for the much greater death rate disparity.
The Department of Defense's "Population Representation in the Military Services (2002)" (http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/poprep2002/chapter2/c2_geography.htm) provided "representation ratios" (fractions of 18-to-24 year olds who enlisted in the military, normalized so that a value of "1" represented the average state) for all 50 states. We find that only three of the five small states had above average representation ratios:
while two of the five big states also had above average representation ratios:
Although the 2005 version of that document did not provide representation ratios, we can estimate those by dividing the number of active component enlisted accessions (which the report did provide, at http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/poprep2005/appendixb/b_10a.html) by each state's population. I then multiplied these fractions by 1000, simply to avoid working with very small numbers. (Two caveats. First, I could not easily find 2005 population figures, so I used the Census Department's 2007 figures, available at http://www.census.gov/. I assume that states' populations did not change much between 2005 and 2007. Second, these numbers are different than the 2002 representation ratios, since they are not normalized and represent fractions of states' entire populations rather than of their 18-to-24-year-old populations.) Here are the results for the smallest states:
and for the largest states:
Again, while residents of the smallest states do seem to join the military in greater proportions than those of the largest states, the difference does not seem to be big enough to account for the much greater disparity in the death rates that Neuharth cites.
I do not know why the percentage of Americans from the nation's smallest states who die in Iraq is so much a greater than the percentage from the biggest states. However, what I do know is that Neuharth's analysis does not seem to explain this phenomenon.
Neuharth provides numbers demonstrating a huge disparity between the "death rates" of the largest and smallest states. I have no way of independently analyzing these numbers, so I'll accept that they are correct. However, I don't buy the two supposed reasons for the disparity.
First, Neuharth claims that Americans from the smallest states earn less than those from the biggest. However, according to the Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income06/statemhi2.html), the median household incomes of the union's five smallest states:
compare quite well with those of the five biggest states:
Second, Neuharth claims that residents of the smallest states are more patriotic than those from the biggest, but he provides no evidence for this statement. Perhaps he is basing it on intuition? I suppose that there are many ways to measure patriotism—the number of Americans who fly U.S. flags on their homes or who have memorized the pledge of allegiance, perhaps—but doubt that there is any single method that most people would agree on. In any case, I—based on intuition—doubt that residents of the union's smallest states are demonstrably more patriotic than those from the biggest.
Yet even if we accepted both of Neuharth's premises, his argument would still be flawed. He appears to suggest that the disparities in income and patriotism lead more Americans from the smallest states to join the military, resulting in a greater number of deaths in Iraq. However, while a greater proportion of Americans from the smallest states do, in fact, appear to join the military, this moderate difference does not seem to account for the much greater death rate disparity.
The Department of Defense's "Population Representation in the Military Services (2002)" (http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/poprep2002/chapter2/c2_geography.htm) provided "representation ratios" (fractions of 18-to-24 year olds who enlisted in the military, normalized so that a value of "1" represented the average state) for all 50 states. We find that only three of the five small states had above average representation ratios:
while two of the five big states also had above average representation ratios:
Although the 2005 version of that document did not provide representation ratios, we can estimate those by dividing the number of active component enlisted accessions (which the report did provide, at http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/poprep2005/appendixb/b_10a.html) by each state's population. I then multiplied these fractions by 1000, simply to avoid working with very small numbers. (Two caveats. First, I could not easily find 2005 population figures, so I used the Census Department's 2007 figures, available at http://www.census.gov/. I assume that states' populations did not change much between 2005 and 2007. Second, these numbers are different than the 2002 representation ratios, since they are not normalized and represent fractions of states' entire populations rather than of their 18-to-24-year-old populations.) Here are the results for the smallest states:
and for the largest states:
Again, while residents of the smallest states do seem to join the military in greater proportions than those of the largest states, the difference does not seem to be big enough to account for the much greater disparity in the death rates that Neuharth cites.
I do not know why the percentage of Americans from the nation's smallest states who die in Iraq is so much a greater than the percentage from the biggest states. However, what I do know is that Neuharth's analysis does not seem to explain this phenomenon.
Sunday, March 30, 2008
How Far Does NATO Need to Go?
As the NATO summit in Bucharest approaches, the United States would like to include Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia in the alliance and extend "membership action plans" (MAPs) to Georgia and Ukraine. Why? Sure, the United States would like to consolidate gains in territory previously considered to be within Russia's sphere of influence, and expanding further east gets NATO closer to various trouble spots, such as the Middle East. However, the consequences of expansion simply outweigh the benefits.
First, expanding eastward (especially into the former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine) would spur the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West. Western assertiveness (including U.S. insistence on expanding strategic ballistic missile defense into Eastern Europe) has already caused Russia to suspend participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, nix START II, restart provocative military actions (such as bomber flights over allied airspace and naval vessels), and threaten to pull out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty. Sure, Russia is relatively weak now and has only limited means of striking back at the West, but this situation will not last forever. As oil prices buoy the Russian economy and military and the government consolidates control within the country, Russian strength will only grow. The United States needs to take a long-term view of its relationship with Russia and plant the seeds of a cooperative, not confrontational, relationship now. This is not to say that we should let Russia hold our foreign policy hostage, but we need to understand Russia's interests and attitude and be able to anticipate its likely responses to our actions.
Second, adding these states as NATO members would debase the alliance's membership criteria. While all of these countries have made some military improvements, their defense capabilities are still nowhere near NATO standards. Furthermore, while they have implemented some democratic reforms, their fledgling democracies are still not out of the woods yet. (Ukraine's Orange Revolution occurred only a few years ago, and just this past winter Georgia's president imposed a state of emergency amid widespread popular protests against his rule.)
Third, we gain little, if anything, from adding these states to the alliance. We might gain basing rights, but there is little reason to put forces into Ukraine (unless we are already planning for a soured relationship with Russia), and while Georgia might serve as a jumping-off point for military action against Iran, there is little need for that as long as we maintain our other bases in the region (in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain, etc.), which seems likely for the foreseeable future. We might consider NATO's previous expansion: in 2004, NATO added seven Eastern European states (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania) to the alliance; has the addition of those states contributed any significant improvement to our security?
Fourth, adding new states brings new obligations for alliance members. Do we really want to be involved in planning for the defense of Ukraine against Russian aggression? What if the secessionist conflicts in Georgia (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) flare up? Or if Russia recognizes those regions as independent states (as it has threatened to do) and then increases its force levels there, on what the United States considers the sovereign territory of a NATO ally? Although Estonia did not invoke Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty when Russia launched a cyberattack against it last year, the feeble response called the alliance's ability to defend even its current members into question.
Fifth, how far does NATO really need to go? The alliance began as an organization of North Atlantic states; does it really need to extend its reach so far afield? If you believe that its primary mission ought to remain collective self-defense, then the answer is clearly no. If you support the alliance's push to take on new missions in the post-Cold War world, then perhaps. However, its record is, at best, spotty so far, as its operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have demonstrated.
For these reasons, NATO should not extend membership invitations to Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia. It is true that NATO only wants to extend MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine and that it might be able to resolve some of these issues before considering membership for those states. However, even extending MAPs has consequences, especially for the West's relationship with Russia. Therefore, the best course of action is for NATO to forego any moves toward expansion and instead deal with its existing issues, such as Afghanistan and Eastern European missile defenses. Doing otherwise would only worsen the alliance's security situation.
First, expanding eastward (especially into the former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine) would spur the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West. Western assertiveness (including U.S. insistence on expanding strategic ballistic missile defense into Eastern Europe) has already caused Russia to suspend participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, nix START II, restart provocative military actions (such as bomber flights over allied airspace and naval vessels), and threaten to pull out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty. Sure, Russia is relatively weak now and has only limited means of striking back at the West, but this situation will not last forever. As oil prices buoy the Russian economy and military and the government consolidates control within the country, Russian strength will only grow. The United States needs to take a long-term view of its relationship with Russia and plant the seeds of a cooperative, not confrontational, relationship now. This is not to say that we should let Russia hold our foreign policy hostage, but we need to understand Russia's interests and attitude and be able to anticipate its likely responses to our actions.
Second, adding these states as NATO members would debase the alliance's membership criteria. While all of these countries have made some military improvements, their defense capabilities are still nowhere near NATO standards. Furthermore, while they have implemented some democratic reforms, their fledgling democracies are still not out of the woods yet. (Ukraine's Orange Revolution occurred only a few years ago, and just this past winter Georgia's president imposed a state of emergency amid widespread popular protests against his rule.)
Third, we gain little, if anything, from adding these states to the alliance. We might gain basing rights, but there is little reason to put forces into Ukraine (unless we are already planning for a soured relationship with Russia), and while Georgia might serve as a jumping-off point for military action against Iran, there is little need for that as long as we maintain our other bases in the region (in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain, etc.), which seems likely for the foreseeable future. We might consider NATO's previous expansion: in 2004, NATO added seven Eastern European states (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania) to the alliance; has the addition of those states contributed any significant improvement to our security?
Fourth, adding new states brings new obligations for alliance members. Do we really want to be involved in planning for the defense of Ukraine against Russian aggression? What if the secessionist conflicts in Georgia (in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) flare up? Or if Russia recognizes those regions as independent states (as it has threatened to do) and then increases its force levels there, on what the United States considers the sovereign territory of a NATO ally? Although Estonia did not invoke Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty when Russia launched a cyberattack against it last year, the feeble response called the alliance's ability to defend even its current members into question.
Fifth, how far does NATO really need to go? The alliance began as an organization of North Atlantic states; does it really need to extend its reach so far afield? If you believe that its primary mission ought to remain collective self-defense, then the answer is clearly no. If you support the alliance's push to take on new missions in the post-Cold War world, then perhaps. However, its record is, at best, spotty so far, as its operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan have demonstrated.
For these reasons, NATO should not extend membership invitations to Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia. It is true that NATO only wants to extend MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine and that it might be able to resolve some of these issues before considering membership for those states. However, even extending MAPs has consequences, especially for the West's relationship with Russia. Therefore, the best course of action is for NATO to forego any moves toward expansion and instead deal with its existing issues, such as Afghanistan and Eastern European missile defenses. Doing otherwise would only worsen the alliance's security situation.
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Welcome to the Hawks and Doves blog! This is my place to rant about international security issues and hopefully for you to rant a bit as well. Enjoy!
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