All of this poses a quandary for the United States, since there seem to be few good options. On the one hand, it would like to support Georgia, a struggling post-Soviet democracy strategically located in the Caucasus along the potential route of an important oil pipeline and threatened by its much larger northern neighbor. On the other hand, the United States does not want to antagonize that neighbor and risk war with it. What's a superpower to do?
The answer is that we need to arm Georgia. It is true that I am not a big fan of getting mixed up in disputes in Russia's back yard; for example, I have always opposed the enlargement of NATO into the former Soviet Union. However, there are several reasons for which we should consider selling weapons to Georgia, perhaps at a steep discount.
First, arms sales would signal a U.S. commitment to Georgia after the MAP fiasco. (The United States strongly supported the extension of NATO "membership action plans" to Georgia and Ukraine, but NATO rejected the proposal at its summit in Bucharest, agreeing merely to reconsider the issue at the end of the year.) Although I was glad that the MAP proposal failed, the United States appeared weak, and the result at Bucharest certainly emboldened Russia to act more freely in Georgia.
Second, arms sales would signal displeasure with Russia's recent troop increase. Even if that increase were within permitted limits, it certainly was not helpful.
Third, arms sales would not upset Russia nearly as much as a deployment of NATO forces or the extension of a MAP, since arms transfers do not necessarily imply any permanent involvement or creep into Russia's sphere of influence. (Although arms sales can be a means of exerting influence with another country, a limited sale to Georgia would be unlikely to alarm Russia about any major U.S. presence in the country.)
Fourth, by reminding all parties involved that military action would be counterproductive, an arms transfer might encourage them to find a peaceful solution, such as the reintegration of the breakaway regions into Georgia in exchange for Georgia's agreement not to seek NATO membership. (This solution would probably be the best outcome, in any case. Although Abkhazia and South Ossetia would certainly object, Russia is the actor that really matters. If it agreed to such a solution, then Abkhaza and South Ossetia would have to accept reintegration into Georgia.)
There is one potential problem, however. Russia justified its recent increase of "peacekeepers" by claiming that Georgia was acquiring offensive arms in preparation for an attack on Abkhazia. (Georgia denied the claim.) How could the United States provide weapons to Georgia without giving Russia clear justification for its moves? The answer is that the United States must provide only defensive materiel, such as fixed air defense items. The sale of only defensive arms would limit Georgia's ability to use the items in any offensive against its breakaway regions (which could easily lead to war with Russia). Because such a sale would not significantly increase Georgia's ability to attack these regions, Russia would have a hard time using it to justify any provocative behavior supposedly in defense of the Abkhazians. Furthermore, providing Georgia with defensive arms might dissuade its enemies from mounting any attack upon it. We have already seen the use of Russian air power in Georgia (when a Russian aircraft shot down the first Georgian drone), so an air defense upgrade could greatly improve Georgia's ability to repel any attack.
In a situation in which the United States has few good options, providing a limited amount of defensive arms to Georgia might be the prudent way to support Tbilisi while avoiding any significant escalation in the region and might encourage all parties to work toward a comprehensive solution to Georgia's difficulties.
The answer is that we need to arm Georgia. It is true that I am not a big fan of getting mixed up in disputes in Russia's back yard; for example, I have always opposed the enlargement of NATO into the former Soviet Union. However, there are several reasons for which we should consider selling weapons to Georgia, perhaps at a steep discount.
First, arms sales would signal a U.S. commitment to Georgia after the MAP fiasco. (The United States strongly supported the extension of NATO "membership action plans" to Georgia and Ukraine, but NATO rejected the proposal at its summit in Bucharest, agreeing merely to reconsider the issue at the end of the year.) Although I was glad that the MAP proposal failed, the United States appeared weak, and the result at Bucharest certainly emboldened Russia to act more freely in Georgia.
Second, arms sales would signal displeasure with Russia's recent troop increase. Even if that increase were within permitted limits, it certainly was not helpful.
Third, arms sales would not upset Russia nearly as much as a deployment of NATO forces or the extension of a MAP, since arms transfers do not necessarily imply any permanent involvement or creep into Russia's sphere of influence. (Although arms sales can be a means of exerting influence with another country, a limited sale to Georgia would be unlikely to alarm Russia about any major U.S. presence in the country.)
Fourth, by reminding all parties involved that military action would be counterproductive, an arms transfer might encourage them to find a peaceful solution, such as the reintegration of the breakaway regions into Georgia in exchange for Georgia's agreement not to seek NATO membership. (This solution would probably be the best outcome, in any case. Although Abkhazia and South Ossetia would certainly object, Russia is the actor that really matters. If it agreed to such a solution, then Abkhaza and South Ossetia would have to accept reintegration into Georgia.)
There is one potential problem, however. Russia justified its recent increase of "peacekeepers" by claiming that Georgia was acquiring offensive arms in preparation for an attack on Abkhazia. (Georgia denied the claim.) How could the United States provide weapons to Georgia without giving Russia clear justification for its moves? The answer is that the United States must provide only defensive materiel, such as fixed air defense items. The sale of only defensive arms would limit Georgia's ability to use the items in any offensive against its breakaway regions (which could easily lead to war with Russia). Because such a sale would not significantly increase Georgia's ability to attack these regions, Russia would have a hard time using it to justify any provocative behavior supposedly in defense of the Abkhazians. Furthermore, providing Georgia with defensive arms might dissuade its enemies from mounting any attack upon it. We have already seen the use of Russian air power in Georgia (when a Russian aircraft shot down the first Georgian drone), so an air defense upgrade could greatly improve Georgia's ability to repel any attack.
In a situation in which the United States has few good options, providing a limited amount of defensive arms to Georgia might be the prudent way to support Tbilisi while avoiding any significant escalation in the region and might encourage all parties to work toward a comprehensive solution to Georgia's difficulties.
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